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BANKRUPTCY AND THE STATE
Adam Feibelman*
ABSTRACT
Anticipating a wave of bankruptcies caused by the economic and financial
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous commentators proposed measures
to expand the institutional capacity of the bankruptcy system. A number of these
proposals would represent dramatic and systematic government involvement in
the U.S. bankruptcy system. Such involvement by the government in the
bankruptcy system is a topic that is largely ignored in the literature on
bankruptcy. Where it is observed, it is generally criticized. Among other things,
it sits uneasily with dominant theories of bankruptcy that assume the bankruptcy
system should be driven by the interests of direct stakeholders in particular
cases. This Article argues that involvement or influence by government actors
in the bankruptcy system is, in fact, broadly consistent with bankruptcy theory
and with the structural relationship between bankruptcy law and other legal and
regulatory components of the state. This relationship is subject to some basic
ordering principles. Bankruptcy law constrains and adjusts other legal regimes
to some extent, but it generally incorporates non-bankruptcy law and yields to
government’s regulatory actions. These ordering principles reasonably extend
to ad hoc government actions or “activism” in the bankruptcy system. In other
words, government actors do not contravene bankruptcy policy when they
employ the system to advance non-bankruptcy policies within their authority,
even when doing so enables the government to take actions and achieve goals
that it could not outside of the system. In some circumstances, however, the
regulatory policies or concerns motivating government involvement in the
bankruptcy system may be too diffuse or attenuated to justify the extent of its
intervention, especially if the effect is to discourage use of the bankruptcy
system.
This Article develops these claims by focusing in particular on the
relationship between bankruptcy and financial regulation. Bankruptcy is part of
the architecture of financial markets in a modern economy, and the influence of
financial regulators on the bankruptcy system should be viewed as the product
*
Sumter Davis Marks Professor of Law, Tulane. Thanks for discussion and comments to Vincent
Buccola, Laura Napoli Coordes, Melissa Jacoby, Rafael Pardo, Nadav Orian Peer, Renuka Sane, David Skeel,
and participants of the 3d Conference on Law and Macroeconomics, fall 2020, and the Indian Institute of
Management Ahmedabad and World Bank Research Conference on Financial Distress, Bankruptcy, and
Corporate Finance, fall 2019. All views and errors are mine.
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of overlapping regulatory functions, which require a logic of ordering. Such
regulatory influence generally operates in the deep background, yet macroprudential and systemic concerns will sometimes require more direct
government intervention and may override the efficiency concerns or stakes of
a particular bankruptcy case. This Article describes three episodes of regulatory
intervention in the bankruptcy system: (1) “regulatory bankruptcy” during the
2008–09 financial crisis; (2) the efforts by the Reserve Bank of India to force
some large commercial firms into India’s new insolvency system; and (3) the
Chrysler bankruptcy. The ordering principles advanced in this Article generally
justify the government involvement in these cases and, to some extent, in the
COVID-era proposals as well. However, the degree of regulatory involvement
in the bankruptcy system envisioned by some of these recent proposals may be
disproportionate to, or attenuated from, their underlying regulatory goals. If so,
they may fall beyond the scope of justified government involvement in the
bankruptcy system.
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INTRODUCTION
In the initial months of the COVID-19 pandemic, there was widespread
concern that the economic effects of the pandemic would cause a dramatic
upsurge of corporate and individual bankruptcy cases in the United States and
around the globe. Although there have been numerous notable bankruptcy
filings in the U.S. since then, and a sizeable caseload more generally, various
factors seem to have held a larger surge of filings at bay, at least for the time
being.1 In the meantime, policymakers in the U.S. adopted some modest and
targeted reforms to the bankruptcy system to assist some debtors affected by the
crisis.2 Over the course of 2020, numerous commentators proposed other, more
significant measures to address a potential upsurge of filings.3 These measures

1
These factors include, most notably, massive government financial support across the economy, private
standstill agreements, and policies at every level of government to mandate or strongly encourage forbearance
by creditors. See, e.g., Jonathon Lipson & Norman M. Powell, Don’t Just Do Something—Stand There! A Modest
Proposal for a Model Standstill/Tolling Agreement, BUS. L. TODAY (Apr. 4, 2020), https://businesslawtoday.org/
2020/04/dont-just-something-stand-modest-proposal-model-standstilltolling-agreement/; Anna Gelpern et al.,
Debt Standstills Can Help Vulnerable Governments Manage the COVID-19 Crisis, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L
ECON. (Apr. 7, 2020, 2:45 PM), https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/debt-standstillscan-help-vulnerable-governments-manage-covid. For example, the CARES Act provided for mortgage payment
forbearance for borrowers with federally backed loans and protection from evictions for those renting property
subject to such loans. See 15 U.S.C. § 9057 (2018).
2
The CARES Act of 2020, for example, increased the scope of eligibility of the new Small Business
Reorganization Act so that more small firms can benefit from its liberalized process. See Coronavirus Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2, 5, 12, 15, 20, 21, 29, 42, and 45 U.S.C.). The Act also provides that pandemic-related
support to individuals will not be counted as income if they file for bankruptcy. Id. Excluding support from
“current monthly income” potentially impacts individuals’ eligibility for chapter 7 and the calculation of
disposable income payable to creditors in chapter 13. Id. The Act also provides that individuals who experience
hardship due to the crisis can modify or extend their chapter 13 plans. Id.
3
See Peter Conti-Brown & David Skeel, Using the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window for Debtor-inPossession Financing During the COVID-19 Bankruptcy Crisis, HUTCHINS CTR. ON FISCAL & MONETARY
POL’Y BROOKINGS (July 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Conti-BrownSkeel.pdf; Peter M. DeMarzo et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing Facility (DIPFF) Proposal, STAN. GRAD.
SCH. BUS. (June 20, 2020), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publication-pdf/dipff.pdf; Kathryn
Judge, Congress Should Allow the Fed to Make Loans to Bankrupt Companies, FORBES (July 22, 2020, 3:06
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kathrynjudge/2020/07/22/congress-should-allow-loans-to-bankruptcompanies/#60e5d7e63a7f; David Skeel, Bankruptcy and the coronavirus, ECON. STUD. BROOKINGS (April 21,
2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/ES-4.21.2020-DSkeel-2.pdf; David Skeel,
Bankruptcy and the coronavirus: Part II, ECON. STUD. BROOKINGS (June 6, 2020), https://www.brookings.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ES-6.6.20-Skeel-1.pdf; Kenneth Ayotte & David Skeel, Bankruptcy Law
Needs a Boost for Coronavirus, WALL ST. J. (March 30, 2020, 6:53 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
bankruptcy-law-needs-a-boost-for-coronavirus-11585608800; Edward R. Morrison & Andrea Saavedra,
Bankruptcy’s Role in the COVID-19 Crisis (Colum. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 624, 2020), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3567127; see also Adam J. Levitin et al., No More Bailouts: A Blueprint for a Standing Emergency
Economic Resilience and Stabilization Program, THE GREAT DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE (June 2020), https://
greatdemocracyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/No-More-Bailouts-Final-Copy-.pdf.
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include increasing bankruptcy court personnel and resources;4 requiring that
some firms file for bankruptcy as a condition of financial support from the
government;5 promoting stream-lined pre-packaged bankruptcy filings;6 and
increasing the amount of resources available for debtor in possession (“DIP”)
financing from the U.S. Treasury or the Federal Reserve.7
These proposals may or may not be promising ways to improve the
functioning of the bankruptcy system in the event of a systemic economic or
financial crisis. But most of them have an important feature in common: they
would significantly expand the direct or indirect involvement of government or
regulatory actors in the operation of the bankruptcy system. Consider, for
example, the proposals to encourage pre-pack filings or to leverage government
lending to require firms to file for bankruptcy as a condition for financial
support. Both entail regulators directly influencing or determining critical
bankruptcy decisions: whether to initiate a proceeding and whether to attempt to
pre-arrange fundamental aspects of a case with important creditors. The proposal
to augment DIP financing through a Federal Reserve facility would provide
support to banks that in turn extend crucial financing to debtors in bankruptcy.
The involvement of those banks in the bankruptcies of their borrowers would be
subject to ongoing supervision by the government, which would also have at
least an indirect financial stake in the outcomes of those bankruptcy cases. The
government would have the motivation and various tools for influencing the
behavior of banks as DIP lenders in their borrowers’ bankruptcies under such a
program.
The debate and discussion of these proposals has largely ignored the
question of how we should evaluate the government’s role in the bankruptcy
system that each would likely involve. In fact, this is a question that the literature
on bankruptcy theory and policy provides few if any useful insights. Most
writing on bankruptcy theory and policy focuses primarily or exclusively on how
it impacts the immediate stakeholders in a debtor’s case.8 Bankruptcy theorists

4
See, e.g., Letter from The Large Corporations Committee of The Bankruptcy and COVID-19 Working
Group to Sens. McConnell and Schumer and Reps. Pelosi and McCarthy (May 7, 2020), http://blogs.harvard.
edu/bankruptcyroundtable/files/2020/05/xLarge-Corporate-Committee_05.18.2020.pdf; see also, Robert K.
Rasmussen, COVID-19 and Bankruptcy Infrastructure, 131 YALE L.J. FORUM 337 (2021).
5
Morrison & Saavedra, supra note 3, at 12–13.
6
Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 3 (“[The U.S. Treasury] could encourage some companies to file
‘prepackaged’ bankruptcies that write down only the company’s largest obligations and can be approved by a
bankruptcy judge in as few as 30 days.”).
7
Conti-Brown & Skeel, supra note 3, at 1, 7; DeMarzo et supra note 3; Morrison & Saavedra, supra
note 3; Judge, supra note 3.
8
See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
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who often disagree on critical features of the system have tended to assume that
the system serves to resolve the microeconomic problems of debtors, their
various creditors, and an array of other direct stakeholders, and that these private
actors drive outcomes based on their self-perceived interests within a legal
framework created by statutes and courts.9
The literature on bankruptcy law primarily addresses how it should balance
the goal of facilitating a debtor’s recovery with that of maximizing the overall
value of the debtor’s estate.10 It generally assumes that, with certain limitations,
debtors make basic decisions about whether to seek relief, and under which
chapter, in the shadow of a predictable set of rules and requirements. Similarly,
it assumes that creditors and affected parties act within the system pursuant to
their own financial and economic motivations subject to the substantive and
procedural constraints of the bankruptcy system.
Largely absent from this common underlying view of bankruptcy is the fact
that government and regulatory actors routinely impact the operation of the
bankruptcy system, sometimes directly and dramatically and sometimes
indirectly and unobserved. When the engagement of government actors in the
bankruptcy system is discussed or observed at all, it is usually in response to a
highly visible and controversial case, and the relationship is then generally
criticized. At least some scholars have proposed that this type of government
involvement is inconsistent with basic theories of bankruptcy law; impairs the
efficient operation of a bankruptcy system; or undermines government
transparency and accountability.11
This Article argues that engagement by government and regulatory actors in
a bankruptcy system is, in most cases, a natural feature of bankruptcy law and
policy, not a distortion. In fact, interaction between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy law and regulation is ubiquitous and part of an overarching
institutional design. Bankruptcy is properly understood as an extension,
component, or qualification of almost every other legal or regulatory regime.
These relationships and interactions sometimes involve some tension between
the unique institutional goals of bankruptcy law and those of the other legal
regimes in question. Such tensions require some ordering among and between
9

See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
11
See Sarah P. Woo, Regulatory Bankruptcy: How Bank Regulation Causes Fire Sales, 99 GEO. L.J.
1615, 1661–62 (2011); see also Sarah P. Woo, Simultaneous Distress of Residential Developers and Their
Secured Lenders: An Analysis of Bankruptcy and Bank Regulation, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 617 (2010);
Jared A. Ellias & George Triantis, Government Activism in Bankruptcy, 37 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J. 509 (2021)
[hereinafter Ellias & Triantis].
10
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these underlying policies. The existing design of bankruptcy and other legal
regimes provides some formal ordering, and while this ordering is somewhat
complex, it does reflect some general principles. In some circumstances,
bankruptcy law is designed to displace or constrain the operation of other legal
or regulatory regimes. It generally does so where it is necessary for the
bankruptcy system to function or to implement specific substantive policies. In
most other circumstances, however, the policies underlying non-bankruptcy
regimes will override those specific to bankruptcy law and policy. This makes
sense as a background principle: bankruptcy law serves a relatively broad and
general function, and most other regimes or policies are more substantively
specific in aim and application.
These ordering principles aid in evaluating some of the controversial aspects
of many recent high-profile bankruptcies, like those of Purdue Pharma, USA
Gymnastics, the Boy Scouts, and various Catholic dioceses. Such cases have
focused attention on bankruptcy law as a means for individuals and firms to
reduce liability or accountability for wrongdoings.12 But this outcome, while
troubling, is a product of a structural relationship between most tort liability and
bankruptcy law, which reflects a system of formal ordering of bankruptcy and
non-bankruptcy law. Under non-bankruptcy law, most tort liability creates an
unsecured claim. Policymakers have elevated the priority and excluded from
discharge some tort claims under bankruptcy law, but a large swath of tort
claims—including most claims for negligence—survive in bankruptcy without
any change in priority or protection from discharge.13 As a result, in most of
these recent high-profile cases, bankruptcy law has effectively operated as a
limitation on the operation and functions of tort law. Much of the criticism of
these cases has focused heavily on that use of bankruptcy law or on aspects of
bankruptcy law that preclude information-forcing litigation.14

12
See, e.g., Lindsey D. Simon, Bankruptcy Grifters, 131 YALE L.J (forthcoming 2021); Adam J. Levitin,
Purdue’s Poison Pill: The Breakdown of Chapter 11 Checks and Balances, 100 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming
2022).
13
Personal liability on obligations is generally discharged in consumer bankruptcies, see 11 U.S.C.
§ 524(a) (2018), but certain debts are excluded from discharge, see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2018). Some tort liability
is included in this category of non-dischargeable debts—i.e., “for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary
capacity, embezzlement, or larceny,” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2018); “for willful and malicious injury by the
debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity,” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2018); and for death or
injury caused by operating a vehicle or vessel while intoxicated, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (2018). By exclusion,
other tort liability—for negligence, for example,—is not excepted from discharge.
14
See, e.g., Simon, supra note 12; Ramon Antonio Vargas, New Orleans Clergy Abuse Plaintiff Aims to
Move Bankruptcy-Halted Case out of Federal Court, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 8, 2020, https://www.nola.
com/news/courts/article_63fd3226-c170-11ea-ae7c-13bf33fea547.html.
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In at least some of those cases, government officials have been active parties
or have influenced the course of proceedings. Such cases complicate any attempt
to evaluate the relationship between bankruptcy and tort law and policy.
Commentary on Purdue Pharma’s bankruptcy case, for example, has focused
largely on whether and how the court can extend bankruptcy protections to
owners of the debtor firm and effectively limit their liability for their actions in
relation to the firm’s marketing of Oxycontin.15 But this issue arises in the
context of a settlement that the firm reached with the Department of Justice and
a number of state attorneys general. From this perspective, the case is an
interesting and illustrative example of government actors using the bankruptcy
system to advance a policy or regulatory goal. This dimension of the case is
especially complicated because it involves a number of different government
actors.
Recently, in this journal, Jared Ellias & George Triantis have given rare
attention to government and regulatory involvement in bankruptcy cases,
focusing in particular on government’s role in the cases of Chrysler and Pacific
Gas & Electric.16 They describe and evaluate how federal and state executive
officials, respectively, exercised influence or control over these bankruptcies to
advance regulatory and policy goals.17 They observe that the U.S. bankruptcy
system provided the government with tools to advance these policies that they
would not have otherwise had.18 As they put it, “the bankruptcy system can be a
force multiplier for government policymaking.”19
While Ellias and Triantis’ account is generally descriptive, they observe that
the advancement of the governments’ policies in these cases was “arguably at
odds with the bankruptcy goal of maximizing the return to claimholders.”20 They
suggest that the government’s use or participation in the bankruptcy system in
these ways lacks the transparency and accountability that is built into the
legislative and regulatory process and in the exercise of executive power.21 They

15

Levitin, supra note 12; see also Ellias & Triantis supra note 11, at 549–50.
Ellias & Triantis, supra note 11, at 522–23.
17
Id. at 525–28.
18
Id. at 511.
19
Id. at 512.
20
Id. at 523.
21
Id. at 545 (“In the American system, governments have immense powers they exercise through welldefined processes of legislation and administrative regulation (whether through rulemaking or adjudication) that,
ideally, provide the checks and balances that come from transparency and accountability. These processes are
absent in the bankruptcy process.”); see also Robert Kenneth Rasmussen, Bankruptcy and the Administrative
State, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1567, 1582–84 (1991).
16
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also express concern that bankruptcy judges are, in general, “not experienced in
being arbiters of complex policy debates.”22
This Article takes a more sanguine view of government involvement or
activism in the bankruptcy system. The ordering principles it identifies reflect
that such involvement is an inevitable or intended product of the structural
relationship of bankruptcy and the state. Bankruptcy is a regulatory tool created
by the state to advance some unique and independent goals, but also to function
in concert with a host of other legal and regulatory regimes. Furthermore, when
government actors influence or direct its operation, the degree of transparency
and accountability in this context is comparable to many other instances of
regulation and executive government law- and policy-making.23 Ellias and
Triantis may be correct that bankruptcy judges are generally not good arbiters
of complex policymaking, but that seems to be a good reason for the bankruptcy
process to generally yield to the actors who are.24
To be clear, this does not mean that every, or even most, government
engagement or utilization of the bankruptcy system is wise or justified as a
matter of policy. Government officials and policymakers can pursue misguided
policies in and through the bankruptcy system just as they can outside of it.
When they do, such actions should be understood as errors in policymaking,
supervision, or regulation. But engagement by state actors in the bankruptcy
system to advance their legal and regulatory aims is itself not structurally
inconsistent with bankruptcy law and policy.
This Article develops its central claims by focusing in particular on the
interaction of bankruptcy and financial regulation and the engagement of
financial regulators in the bankruptcy system. This interaction is one of the most
extensive examples of the basic relationship between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy law and regulation. Financial regulators inevitably exert some
influence in the bankruptcy system because the institutions they regulate and
supervise are ubiquitous creditors, often dominant ones, within it.
The involvement and influence of financial regulators in a bankruptcy
system should be understood as an essential part of the operation of a bankruptcy
system, not as an interference acting upon it. This proposition rests initially on
22

Ellias & Triantis, supra note 11, at 545 (2021).
Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy in the Administrative State, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987,
at 3, 32 (“[S]haring traditional agency decisions with a bankruptcy court . . . does not substantially decrease
political accountability.”).
24
See Adam Feibelman, Federal Bankruptcy and State Sovereign Immunity, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1381, 1405–
06 (2003) (making a similar argument with respect to state sovereign immunity and bankruptcy).
23
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an understanding of bankruptcy law as itself a species of financial regulation, a
component of the overall framework regulating a modern financial system. Even
when it operates through private decision-making of debtors, creditors and other
stakeholders, a bankruptcy or insolvency system is itself a regulatory tool
designed and adopted by policymakers to advance various social, economic, and
financial policies.
As a structural matter, the indirect influence and direct engagement of
financial regulators in otherwise private decisions regarding bankruptcy
proceedings is a product of overlapping legal and regulatory domains. In most
cases, this influence and engagement by the government is consistent with the
unique goals and policies of the bankruptcy system and the private interests of
stakeholders within that system. This is especially true when financial regulatory
goals are microprudential in nature, i.e., focused on the safety and soundness of
particular financial institutions. But in some cases, these imperatives run counter
to the private interests of stakeholders in particular cases, including those
intermediaries—banks—through whom the regulators act. This may occur, for
example, in times of financial crises. At such times, financial regulatory goals
and policies tend to be macro-prudential, in furtherance of systemic efforts to
promote economic and financial stability. The operation of a bankruptcy system
may be an important component of these efforts, sometimes involving the direct
or indirect intervention by financial regulators and other government actors.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets forth a very general account of
the relationship between bankruptcy law and other legal and regulatory regimes.
It describes the underlying regulatory function of bankruptcy itself and its
relationship to other regulatory regimes, providing an informal typology of
bankruptcy’s interaction with other legal regimes and engagement by state actors
in the bankruptcy system. It observes ordering between bankruptcy and these
other regimes in the existing institutional design and draws broader ordering
principles from that design. It argues that, as a structural matter, non-bankruptcy
legal and regulatory goals prevail over bankruptcy functions unless bankruptcy
law is specifically designed to override them. It also argues, however, that such
involvement is less justified, and perhaps sometimes overreaching, when the
non-bankruptcy regulatory goal is diffuse or attenuated or if that involvement
discourages use of the bankruptcy system.
Part II elaborates upon those ordering principles by focusing on the
interaction of bankruptcy law and financial regulation and on the involvement
of financial regulators in the bankruptcy system. This relationship is both an
illustrative and a uniquely important instance of bankruptcy’s role as a
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component or extension of other legal and regulatory regimes. Part II.B.
describes three case studies of direct regulatory involvement in a bankruptcy
system, two from the U.S. and one from India: the efforts of banking regulators
to direct banks to reduce their exposure to commercial real estate during the
2008–09 financial crisis; the U.S. government’s involvement in Chrysler’s
bankruptcy in 2009;25 and directives by the Reserve Bank of India (the “RBI”)
to require banks to initiate insolvency proceedings for borrowers with the
banking system’s largest non-performing loans. The RBI example reflects that
the ordering principles developed here are comparatively general if not
universal—in any event, they are not a feature limited to the U.S. institutional
design and experience. Part II.C. also describes some concerns and criticism that
legal scholars have expressed about these interventions, responds to those
concerns and criticisms. Part II.D. examines some of the recent pandemicrelated proposals for bankruptcy reforms. It concludes that such interventions,
though debatable as government policies, would be consistent with bankruptcy
policy unless the extent of the interventions were disproportionate to, or too
attenuated from, their underlying regulatory goals.
I.

A VERY GENERAL THEORY

Any bankruptcy system is an intervention by the state in private affairs, a
species of regulation, and an expression of unique policy objectives. These are
briefly described in Part I.A. Because bankruptcy law is designed to
comprehensively address the financial affairs of insolvent debtors—individuals,
corporations, and governments—it is inevitably embedded in a broader fabric
comprised of almost all other legal and regulatory systems. Thus, as Part I.B.
explains, bankruptcy abuts or overlaps with every other legal and regulatory
regime that affects these debtors and other stakeholders in their bankruptcy
cases. It can be understood as, among other things, an extension or a component
of these other legal and regulatory regimes.
This raises a critical foundational question: how should we understand this
relationship between bankruptcy and other manifestations of the state and
evaluate the interactions between them? The boundaries and dynamics of this
relationship are complex but subject to some general description. In normal
times, these relationships are pretty seamless, unobserved, and unremarkable
and the goals of bankruptcy and other policies are roughly complimentary or
consistent. In some circumstances, however, the policies and functions of
bankruptcy and other regimes run in different directions and stand in tension. In
25

Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 730 (2010).
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such cases, some ordering principles are necessary as a practical matter and
useful for evaluating the effect of the operation of bankruptcy law on other
regimes and vice versa.
Some ordering has been resolved by policymakers and is settled in the design
of bankruptcy law and of other legal regimes. In some ways, bankruptcy law is
designed to curtail or adjust aspects of other legal or regulatory regimes; in other
ways, it is designed to reinforce and extend their effective reach. Part I.C. derives
a set of basic ordering principles from the existing institutional design. To the
extent that stakeholders in bankruptcy are subject to other regulatory regimes or
state authorities that are not expressly displaced by the operation of bankruptcy
law, such external regimes and authority will shape, constrain, guide, or even
govern at least some of their behavior and decision-making. Sometimes such
influence operates passively and indirectly; at other times it operates actively
and directly. Among other things, this means that state actors are ubiquitous
participants, and are themselves frequently direct stakeholders, in the
bankruptcy system. This general dynamic is, in fact, broadly consistent with
prevailing and competing theories of bankruptcy law.26
A. Qua Bankruptcy
The unique and critical role of a bankruptcy or insolvency system is to
provide a collective process for addressing the financial distress of a common
debtor that is unable to satisfy all of its obligations. Debtors may experience
such distress because they have an unsustainable level of debt or because they
cannot pay obligations as they become due or because of some combination of
both. In the U.S., the goal of bankruptcy for individuals is generally to provide
relief and a fresh start and to allocate losses among creditors in a predictable and
timely process. For corporate debtors, it aims to provide a relatively efficient
process for determining whether to liquidate or reorganize the debtor and for
facilitating that liquidation or reorganization. Major themes in the scholarly
literature on corporate bankruptcy have included whether the system adequately
protects secured creditors; whether it maximizes the overall returns to creditors
from their defaulting debtors; whether the system effectively insures
entrepreneurs against the risk of financial distress; and whether it adequately
weighs the interests and potential consequences for stakeholders like employees
and suppliers of firms that might be liquidated or reorganized.

26

See Feibelman, supra note 3, at 1412–16 (making this argument with respect to state governments).
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Twenty years ago, Douglas Baird proposed that scholarship on bankruptcy
policy was dominated by two competing “axioms,” which he characterized as
proceduralist and traditionalist.27 In his view, proceduralists assume that
bankruptcy should generally not disturb the non-bankruptcy substantive rights
of debtors and creditors and should instead solve a collective action problem
among creditors, thereby maximizing their collective recovery from debtors.28
Traditionalists, in contrast, aim to balance a much wider range of interests in the
bankruptcy system, especially including workers and broader communities, in
determining the fate of debtor firms.29 Although Baird’s characterization of
these axioms has been contested, this terminology has endured, and his general
analysis did capture something fundamental about the prevailing and conflicting
concerns within bankruptcy scholarship.
Notwithstanding the important differences between these competing
approaches to bankruptcy law and theory, they share some important underlying
views about the function of a bankruptcy system. They generally agree, for
example, that firms should be restructured if they have sufficient value as a going
concern and that creditors must be protected enough in the process to avoid
disrupting access to credit for productive ventures. The differences among
scholars tends to relate to such factors as how the system should determine going
concern value, how it should be compared to liquidation value, and how to weigh
the importance of supporting efficient credit markets ex ante.30
Furthermore, with a few notable exceptions,31 contemporary scholarship and
commentary on bankruptcy law on both sides of this debate examines the
operation of the bankruptcy system with regard to its most direct stakeholders—
debtors, their creditors, and stakeholders like children, former spouses,
employees, and taxing authorities. This literature primarily analyzes the rules
and processes that do or should apply within the system; the impact of those
rules and processes on debtors and their creditors and those stakeholders; how
those stakeholders drive the operation of the bankruptcy system and its
outcomes; and how the system affects those parties’ incentives and orders their
27

Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 576–77 (1998).
Id. at 581–82.
29
Id. at 583.
30
See Melissa B. Jacoby, Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1715, 1716 n.3 (2018)
(“In short, the field of corporate bankruptcy has been redistricted to wealth maximization, voluntary lenders, and
investors.”) (and citing criticism). Compare Anthony J. Casey, Chapter 11’s Renegotiation Framework and the
Purpose of Corporate Bankruptcy, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1709 (2020), with Alan Schwartz, A Normative Theory
of Business Bankruptcy, 91 VA. L. REV. 1199 (2005), and Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract
Bankruptcy, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 503 (2001).
31
See infra notes 35–44 and accompanying text.
28
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behavior. As Sarah Woo has observed, existing debates over bankruptcy law fall
within a “standard paradigm” according to which the behavior of stakeholders
can be “explained simply by understanding the economics of the case itself,”
and that it is the stakeholders’ understanding of their economic interests that
drive their behavior.32 Participants in normative debates about bankruptcy
generally share the assumption that the system operates according to the rules
and procedures designed by Congress and the courts, through the actions of
bankruptcy judges and trustees and the private parties who order their affairs in
relation to the design and operation of that system.
But aspects of bankruptcy systems are designed and adopted by
policymakers to serve some other substantive policies as well. They do so, for
example, by improving the priority of some specific creditors—such as tort
victims of impaired drivers33—over their non-bankruptcy position. More
generally, bankruptcy law serves macro-economic functions by helping
influence or steer private parties’ transactions ex ante or strategies ex post.34 This
regulatory aspect of bankruptcy law is reflected, most often implicitly, in the
literature on the topic and often forms the basis of normative views about the
proper design and operation of the regime. Thus, for example, scholars have
proposed that maximizing returns for creditors promotes economic growth by
reducing the cost of credit; that protecting secured creditors in particular
promotes efficient allocation of assets in the economy; and that insuring
individuals from financial distress and protecting other stakeholders, like
employees, can reduce broader social costs and externalities of financial distress.
There is a small but growing literature that has addressed the macroeconomic and regulatory functions of bankruptcy more directly.35 As discussed
below in more detail, this view of bankruptcy has been most pronounced in the
field of financial regulation and the literature on that topic. But this literature
generally views those macro-economic and regulatory functions as deriving

32
Sarah P. Woo, Regulatory Bankruptcy: How Bank Regulation Causes Fire Sales, 99 GEO. L.J. 1615,
1661 (2011).
33
11 U.S.C. § 507(10) (2018).
34
See infra note 64–66 and accompanying text.
35
See, e.g., Zachary Liscow, Counter-Cyclical Bankruptcy Law: An Efficiency Argument for
Employment-Preserving Bankruptcy Rules, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1465–66 (2016), see also Yair Listokin,
A Theoretical Framework for Law and Macroeconomics, 21 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 46, 58 (2019) (noting that
consumer bankruptcy can have an impact on consumption); John Armour & Douglas Cumming, Bankruptcy
Law and Entrepreneurship, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 303, 304 (2008); TERENCE C. HALLIDAY & BRUCE G.
CARRUTHERS, BANKRUPT: GLOBAL LAWMAKING AND SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISIS at xxi (2009); Adam
Feibelman, Consumer Bankruptcy as Development Policy, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 63, 66 (2009).
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from the substantive outcomes for stakeholders, i.e., the accumulation of microeconomic effects of bankruptcy for debtors, creditors, and other stakeholders.
There is also an important and growing strand of literature that focuses
directly on bankruptcy as a species of regulation and public law.36 Much of this
work compares bankruptcy to other types of regulatory regimes in the United
States and its relationship to the administrative state. Theodore Eisenberg
provided one of the earliest and most systematic accounts of bankruptcy law as
a matter of regulatory theory.37 He characterized bankruptcy as “supplementary
regulatory mechanism”38 and “suggest[ed] that bankruptcy may provide a useful
mechanism for enhancing the goals of administrative law.”39 Robert Rasmussen
examined bankruptcy law and formal non-bankruptcy agencies as largely
alternative forums for public policymaking and proposed a framework for
deciding which forum is best suited to particular disputes involving the
government or government policymaking.40 Rafael Pardo and Kathryn Watts
also compare structural aspects of bankruptcy with formal agencies and argue
that Congress effectively delegated policymaking responsibility for bankruptcy
law to the federal judiciary.41 More recently, Pardo has further emphasized the
regulatory function of bankruptcy law by, for example, characterizing the
bankruptcy estate as a federal legal instrumentality42 and the bankruptcy
discharge as a government grant.43 Melissa Jacoby has made a compelling case
that bankruptcy law is properly understood as a public-private partnership in
which many important (public) regulatory functions of bankruptcy law are
allocated by policymakers to private actors.44

36
Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 384 (2012); Jacoby, supra note 30; Rafael I. Pardo, On Bankruptcy’s Promethean Gap:
Building Enslaving Capacity into the Antebellum Administrative State, 48 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 801 (2021); see
also Eisenberg, supra note 23; Robert Kenneth Rasmussen, Bankruptcy and the Administrative State, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 1567 (1991); Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking
Upends the Creditors’ Bargain, 99 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1241 (2013).
37
Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 3, 20–28.
38
Id. at 3, 29.
39
Id. at 3, 28. Eisenberg argues, among other things, that the bankruptcy system may provide for greater
representation of diverse interests in outcomes than non-bankruptcy regulatory practice. Id. at 22–26.
40
Rasmussen, supra note 36, at 3, 20–28.
41
Pardo & Watts, supra note 36, at 386–87.
42
Pardo, supra note 36, at 806.
43
Id. at 842.
44
Jacoby, supra note 30, at 1717. Jacoby argues that understanding the public function of bankruptcy law
compels that the system “advance public values.” Id. at 1720; see also, Melissa B. Jacoby, Shocking Business
Bankruptcy Law, 131 YALE L.J. FORUM 409 (2021).
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B. Overlaps and Ordering
While bankruptcy is itself a regulatory intervention by the state with its own
particular functions and regulatory goals, it is also uniquely intertwined with
almost the entire legal and regulatory landscape in most societies, certainly in
the United States. This is due, first, to the exceptionally broad scope of eligibility
for individuals and entities to be debtors in bankruptcy in the U.S.—most
individuals, corporate entities, non-profits, and many government entities in the
country can seek bankruptcy protection.45 They bring to the bankruptcy system
the full range of their legal and regulatory relationships, rights, obligations, and
interests. Bankruptcy can thus be understood as an arena in which almost every
other legal domain is often implicated. This section provides an informal
descriptive typology of the relationships that bankruptcy has with other legal and
regulatory domains and proposes a set of ordering principles for those
relationships.
1. Interactions
The structural arrangement of bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy law, direct
government claims in bankruptcy cases, and the exercise of regulatory and
executive power by government actors are all examples of a broad category of
interaction between bankruptcy and the state. Understanding the scope and types
of interaction between bankruptcy and other legal and regulatory regimes is an
initial step in evaluating salient or dramatic instances of the involvement of
government actors in a bankruptcy system. To be clear, the various types of
interaction and modes engagement described below are non-exclusive; any
particular case may involve numerous types of interaction and modes of
engagement.
As a foundational matter, there is a basic and well-understood structural
relationship between bankruptcy law and countless other legal and regulatory
regimes that define the rights and responsibilities of stakeholders in the
bankruptcy system and the relationships among them. Most obviously and
broadly, such regimes include the basic background law of contracts, property,
and tort, as well as their subsidiary regimes like rules governing security
interests, intellectual property, and various others. Beyond these core
background core legal regimes, specialized regulatory regimes like tax law,
family law, environmental law, financial regulation, regulation of health care

45

See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2018).
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industry, etc., also routinely define and determine rights and relationships of
stakeholders in the bankruptcy system.46
Aside from creating and defining the rights and relationships that are directly
implicated in bankruptcy cases, non-bankruptcy legal and regulatory regimes
also influence parties’ strategic interests and their behavior in the bankruptcy
system. Decisions that stakeholders make within or regarding the bankruptcy
system are motivated at least in some part by the operation of these other
regimes. The tax consequences of a bankruptcy filing, for example, may be a
significant factor in a debtor’s decision to file.47 Similarly, tax consequences or
capital requirements may also influence a creditor’s decision to support or resist
a debtor’s plan of reorganization or their decision to seek relief from the
automatic stay.48
The types of interaction between bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy legal and
regulatory regimes described above are generally passive or indirect, i.e., a
product of bankruptcy law generally incorporating pre-existing rights,
responsibilities and relationships.49 But in many circumstances, the relationship
involves the active engagement of state officials in the bankruptcy system. Such
active engagement most often occurs when governments or government actors
have a direct financial or regulatory stake in a bankruptcy case. Frequently, the
state engages in the bankruptcy system in a routine fashion because the debtor
owes a tax obligation or some type of fee, penalty, or fines to the government,
or has a contractual obligation to the government.50 As a result, government

46
See, e.g., Joshua Macey & Jackson Salovaara, Bankruptcy as Bailout: Coal Company Insolvency and
the Erosion of Federal Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 879, 893–96 (2019); Lawrence V. Gelber et al., The Intersection
of Environmental and Bankruptcy Laws, in ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (AM. BAR.
ASSOC. 2011); Laura Napoli Coordes, Reorganizing Healthcare Bankruptcy, 61 B.C. L. REV. 419, 425–31
(2020); Shu-Yi Oei, Taxing Bankrupts, 55 B.C. L. REV. 375, 381–91 (2014); Jonathon S. Byington, The Fresh
Start Canon, 69 Florida L. Rev. 115, 118–23 (2017); Lindsey Simon, Chapter 11 Shapeshifters, 68 ADMIN. L.
REV. 233, 237–41 (2016); Rasmussen, supra note 36, at 1567–68; Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 3 (examining
bankruptcy in relation to public utility regulation); Jacoby, supra note 30, at 1724; see also 11 U.S.C.
§§ 507(a)(1), (8) (2018).
47
See Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U. S. 434, 438 (1999)
(“[T]he Debtor responded with a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 . . . [t]he Debtor’s principal
objective was to ensure that its partners retained title to the property so as to avoid roughly $20 million in
personal tax liabilities, which would fall due if the Bank foreclosed.”); Diane Lourdes Dick, Bankruptcy’s
Corporate Tax Loophole, 92 FORDHAM L. REV. 2273 (2014); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(d) (2018) (providing that a
chapter 11 plan will not be confirmed “if the principal purpose of the plan is the avoidance of taxes”).
48
See infra Part II.B(1).
49
See infra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
50
See Feibelman, supra note 24, at 1382 & n.1 (2003) (citing a 1996 study finding that state governments
were creditors in over 350,000 bankruptcy cases and filed tax claims valued at approximately $3.6 billion in that
year); see also, Simon, supra note 46, at 281; Oei, supra note 46.
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actors are regular and frequent claimants in consumer and corporate
bankruptcies.51 They are also sometimes subject to claims and actions in
bankruptcy cases.52
Government actors may also have regulatory interests in bankruptcy cases
aside from any direct financial stake.53 Sometimes these interests are general and
ongoing, such as when a debtor in bankruptcy or some of its activity is subject
to regulatory approval or supervision. The debtor may, for example, have one or
more licenses issued by a government entity, perhaps a driver’s license or a
license authorizing a particular activity that comprises some or all of the debtor’s
profession or business.54 In other cases, the government’s regulatory interest is
related to routine enforcement of legal and regulatory policies, like imposing
liability for torts or criminal activity. In still other cases, the government’s
interest may be exceptional in some fashion. This may occur because the case
implicates an issue that is not directly related to an existing regime but is within
the government’s general authority or because the particular case may have
unique implications due to the size of the debtor or the scope of its potential
impact.
This structural relationship between bankruptcy and other legal and
regulatory regimes provides context for such cases in which the government’s
interest in the operation of the bankruptcy system is either not routine or is more
determinative. In some cases, for example, government actors are able to
influence or cause the initiation of a bankruptcy case, perhaps because it has
leverage as a pre-petition financial creditor or has some regulatory authority over
the debtor in question or another party with the power to trigger a case. This
presumably happens when a government actor finds that its interest and policies
can best be pursued through the bankruptcy system. This should be understood
as a decision by the government actor to use the machinery of the bankruptcy
system as a regulatory or policy tool.

51

See Feibelman, supra note 24, at 1382 & n.1 (2003).
In Katz, the Supreme Court found that states do not enjoy sovereign immunity from claims in
bankruptcy. Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 359 (2006). The government can also
owe obligations to debtors in bankruptcy if, for example, they purchase goods from those debtors on credit. See
David W. Dykhouse, The Katz Principle Resurgent: State Sovereign Immunity Remains Abrogated in
Bankruptcy, PATTERSON BELKNAP: BANKR. UPDATE BLOG (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.pbwt.com/bankruptcyupdate-blog/the-katz-principle-resurgent-state-sovereign-immunity-remains-abrogated-in-bankruptcy.
53
See Simon, supra note 46, at 281 (examining circumstances in which government actors assert both
financial claims and regulatory authority).
54
See, e.g., In re Burgess, 234 B.R. 793, 795, 798 (D. Nev. 1999).
52
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The government may take this triggering action because the debtor or other
private stakeholders will not otherwise initiate a bankruptcy a case.55 This may
be because the private actors who could employ the system do not perceive it to
be in their interest to do so. They may misperceive their interests or the likely
outcomes for them under bankruptcy law; but they may rightly perceive that the
operation of the system is in tension with their own particular interests of the
moment.56 Especially in times of systemic economic or financial stress,
regulatory or macro-economic functions of bankruptcy law may require
outcomes that are sub-optimal at the case level or from the perspective of critical
stakeholders in particular cases.57
Similarly, government actors may also aim to steer or influence the operation
of the system and its outcomes. They may do this as a dominant claimant or
through other leverage they have over the debtor. Such leverage may be a
product of the debtor’s financial distress or the relevant government actor’s
authority over the debtor. The government’s ability to steer or influence the
operation of the bankruptcy in a particular case—like its ability to trigger a case
to begin with—may also stem from its relationship to other stakeholders in the
case. For example, as discussed in more detail below, a debtor’s creditor may
itself be a heavily regulated entity.
2. Ordering Principles
The interaction of bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy law and the involvement
of government entities and actors in the bankruptcy system represent
overlapping legal and regulatory domains that inevitably require some ordering
and coordination.58 As Theodore Eisenberg put it over 30 years ago,
“Bankruptcy and any particular regulatory scheme are each isolated from the
rest of the legal world. When two remote areas require coordination, surprising
results can occur.”59 This section describes the extent of formal ordering and

55
Morrison & Saavedra, supra note 3 at 9–10; Michelle J. White, Why Don’t More Households File for
Bankruptcy, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 206 (1998).
56
See Sean Hagan, Debt Restructuring and Economic Recovery, in SOVEREIGN DEBT MANAGEMENT 359,
360 (Rosa M. Lastra & Lee Bucheit eds., 2014) (“[B]anks are often reluctant to engage in the debt restructuring
process simply because the recognition of a loss on their balance sheets will have adverse capital implications.
For this reason, vigilant supervision by bank regulators is a necessary feature of any debt restructuring
strategy.”).
57
See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
58
See, e.g., Oei, supra note 46 (exploring how to balance and coordinate bankruptcy and tax policy goals
when tax debtors file for bankruptcy).
59
Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 3, 8.
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coordination and derives broader ordering principles from that descriptive
account.
The design of existing law and institutions provides a good deal of formal
ordering and coordination of bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy law and
regulation. Pursuant to this ordering, the operation of bankruptcy and other
regimes is generally complementary. The interaction of bankruptcy law and
other legal regimes is at least broadly consistent with the underlying policy aims
of the various regimes and institutions involved.
The basic foundation of this ordering is the passive structural relationship
described above between bankruptcy and other legal regimes that define the
rights, obligations, and relationships between debtors and other stakeholders in
the bankruptcy system. The Supreme Court famously described this relationship
in Butner v. United States:
Congress has generally left the determination of property rights in the
assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state law . . . . Unless some federal
interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests
should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is
involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.60

Bankruptcy theorists who might be categorized as either proceduralist or
traditionalist would find this statement broadly uncontroversial, though different
strands of the literature emphasize different parts of it. Proceduralist theorists
draw from Butner a general insight that bankruptcy should presumably honor
non-bankruptcy rights and priorities; bankruptcy is primarily a procedural
mechanism for sorting out non-bankruptcy rights, obligations, claims, and legal
relationships.61 Scholars who embrace a broader role for bankruptcy law
emphasize that, in many circumstances, some federal interest requires a different
result. Generally, that federal interest is bankruptcy-specific, but sometimes it is
related to non-bankruptcy policy.
Thus, the design of bankruptcy and other legal regimes imposes a basic, if
complex, background order in which non-bankruptcy legal regimes largely
determine the operation of the bankruptcy system and bankruptcy law constrains
and sometimes alters the operation of those other regimes. Some of the most
familiar and important bankruptcy constraints or alterations to non-bankruptcy
regimes are the automatic stay, the discharge of most unsecured claims,
adjustments to the rights of secured claimants, and the ability to cure contractual
60
61

Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54–55 (1979).
See, e.g., DOUGLAS BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 5 (6th ed., Foundation Press 2014).
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defaults.62 Bankruptcy adjusts some priorities among unsecured claims and
exempted some from discharge, but, as discussed immediately below, some of
these priorities and exemptions largely reflect practical priorities or leverage
outside of bankruptcy.63
Existing law also reflects a similarly complex arrangement in the treatment
of state actors when they engage directly in the bankruptcy system as
stakeholders in pursuit of either their financial or regulatory goals. When the
government is a creditor to a debtor in bankruptcy, it must generally follow basic
bankruptcy rules, and it is treated as other claimants.64 In most circumstances,
for example, the government creditor must discontinue debt collection efforts
during the case pursuant to the automatic stay.
On the other hand, some government claims, especially many recent tax
claims, enjoy formal priority over other unsecured claims65 and are exempted
from the bankruptcy discharge.66 Recent tax penalties do not enjoy priority but
some are non-dischargeable.67 As noted above, like most other priorities and
advantages under bankruptcy law, most of these particular rules reflect priorities
and advantages that such claims enjoy outside of bankruptcy compared to other
unsecured claims.68 But many other government claims are not accorded priority
over other unsecured claims and are dischargeable in bankruptcy.69
Government actors that engage in the bankruptcy system more directly in
pursuit of their regulatory policies enjoy significantly more deference under
62
Ellias & Triantis, supra note 11, at 514–15 (“Bankruptcy law undermines systems of regulation with
three tools: (1) the automatic stay on enforcement actions; (2) the prohibition on discriminating against insolvent
or bankrupt debtors in some forms of regulatory enforcement; and (3) the discharge of claims after confirmation
of a reorganization plan.”).
63
In consumer bankruptcies, domestic support obligations, such as child support, enjoy priority over all
other unsecured claims, 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1), and are non-dischargeable, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5). Outside of
bankruptcy, child support claims enjoy various priorities over other debts, including potential criminal liability
and exceptions to limits on wage garnishment. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (2018).
64
See supra note 53 and accompanying test.
65
See Oei, supra note 46, at 382–85 (defending the existing scheme of priority for tax claims under the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code); 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (2018).
66
See Oei, supra note 46, at 388–90; 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (2018). Some other government claims are
also exempt from discharge, such as some student loan obligations, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2018), and some
fines and penalties, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7), (14B) (2018), for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary
capacity, embezzlement, or larceny.
67
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (2018).
68
Failure to pay federal taxes, for example, results automatically in a tax lien. 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (2018).
Tax liens are not subject to state law exemptions, and perfected liens enjoy priority over other creditors, including
other secured creditors, 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a) (2018). See also Oei, supra note 46, at 400–01.
69
Simon, supra note 46, at Part II (2016) (observing, however, that government agencies may be able to
adopt “shapeshifting” strategies to collect claims in administrative settings without violating the automatic stay).
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bankruptcy law. Where the government’s engagement or involvement in a
bankruptcy is based on its police or regulatory power, it enjoys an exception
from the automatic stay; it can take actions against the debtor or the debtor’s
estate that are enjoined for other parties.70 A government entity that is entitled
to this exception may voluntarily stay its activities but need not do so. The
government bears the burden of showing that its actions fall within the
exception, however, and courts carefully review these claims. In some cases,
government actions are found to fall outside the exception,71 but presumably at
least some number of government actions subject to the exception are not
challenged in the first place. The government is also prohibited from
discriminating against a debtor simply because the debtor has filed for
bankruptcy protection, even if the government actor would otherwise be acting
under its legal or regulatory authority.72 Finally, Title 28 U.S.C. § 959(b)
provides that a debtor or trust must “manage and operate the property in [their]
possession . . . according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in
which such property is situated,”73 which is “designed to limit the extent to
which an insolvent debtor can use a bankruptcy proceeding to avoid the
operation of state regulatory laws.”74
In sum, as a matter of formal ordering, government actors are generally
subject to the basic rules of bankruptcy. For some claims, they enjoy advantages
70
Actions by government and regulatory actors are excepted from the automatic stay if they are “to
enforce such governmental unit’s or organization’s police and regulatory power.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (2018).
Section 362(b)(4) requires “the enforcement of a judgment other than a money judgment, obtained in an action
or proceeding by the governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s or organization’s police or
regulatory power.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (2018); see Simon, supra note 46, at 238–39 (2016); Eisenberg, supra
note 23, at 3, 12 (suggesting, however, that this exception “is a slender foundation on which to construct a legal
relationship between bankruptcy and regulation.”).
71
See Ellias & Triantis, supra note 11, at 515–17 (reviewing judicial approaches to the exception); see
also Feibelman, supra note 24, at 1426–27.
72
11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2018).

[A] governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license, permit,
charter, franchise, or other similar grant to, condition such a grant to, discriminate with respect
to such a grant against, deny employment to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with
respect to employment against, a person that is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt
or a debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, or another person with whom such bankrupt or debtor has
been associated, solely because such bankrupt or debtor is or has been a debtor under this title or
a bankrupt or debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, has been insolvent before the commencement of
the case under this title, or during the case but before the debtor is granted or denied a discharge,
or has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case under this title or that was discharged under
the Bankruptcy Act.
Id.
73
74

28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (2018).
Feibelman, supra note 24, at 1423.

FEIBELMAN_2.1.22

22

2/3/2022 1:43 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

over private stakeholders in the form of priorities and non-dischargeability, but
these advantages are limited and roughly track those available to the government
outside of bankruptcy. The exception of regulatory actions from operation of the
automatic stay, on the other hand, reflects a clear and concrete policy choice that
the machinery of bankruptcy law should bend to genuine external regulatory
imperatives.
Taken together with the underlying structural relationship between
bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy law and regulation, these elements of
institutional design reveal an ordering principle and a broader logic of
coordination between bankruptcy law and other legal and regulatory regimes.75
Bankruptcy is a general scheme with unique goals and functions, which
inevitably implicate and incorporate non-bankruptcy policies with more
particular substantive goals and functions.76 Bankruptcy imposes some
meaningful constraints on other legal regimes and government actors, yet it
generally gives effect to the particular policies of non-bankruptcy law. While
government actors must often follow bankruptcy rules when pursuing their
specific competencies, they should be expected to utilize the bankruptcy system
to pursue those objectives. When they do, and if their objectives deviate from
the internal logic or goals of the bankruptcy system, that should not be
understood as a distortion of bankruptcy policy.77
These principles provide their own limitation or corollary, i.e., that the
government should yield more to bankruptcy law and policy when it is not
pursuing regulatory aims, perhaps when it is acting to advance its financial
interests, or when its regulatory interest is minor compared to the bankruptcy
function. This is especially true if such state actions will have the effect of
deterring stakeholders from utilizing the bankruptcy system in the first place. If
state actors are engaging with the bankruptcy system in ways that are attenuated
or disconnected from their regulatory remit, such as pursuing purely
compensatory or financial objectives, their interventions in the bankruptcy
system should be viewed with skepticism.78

75

Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54–55 (1979).
Ellias & Triantis, supra note 11, at 516 (“The exercise of discretion by bankruptcy judges under these
exceptions effectively shape the boundaries between those regulatory actions that are subordinated to
bankruptcy’s goals and those that are not.”).
77
See Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 3, 9 (arguing that when a regulated firm is in the bankruptcy system,
its regulator’s “role in bankruptcy is likely to be especially interesting and important). Eisenberg examined the
relationship between public utility regulators and the bankruptcy system and noted debate over the proper
ordering of those regulatory spheres. See Eisenberg, supra note 23, at n.47.
78
See Simon, supra note 46, at 233.
76
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Government actors’ pecuniary interests are arguably never purely so and are
at least partly regulatory in nature.79 To be sure, some financial claims are clearly
regulatory in nature. Tax policy, for example, incorporates a variety of
regulatory goals; rates, penalties, and fines are often designed and adopted to
affect taxpayers’ incentives to engage in or avoid certain activities.80 In some
circumstances when government entities are pursuing claims for money,
however, such as claims for compensation, they are less likely to be designed to
directly advance regulatory policies. Such claims do generally help fund the
regulatory enterprise,81 but this is attenuated from any particular legal or
regulatory goal. This distinction between government’s pecuniary and
regulatory interests is reflected in bankruptcy doctrine, especially the fact that
the government’s regulatory exception to the automatic stay does not extend to
pecuniary matters.
The ordering principles described above provide a basis for evaluating ad
hoc engagement by government entities or actors in the bankruptcy system. As
a structural matter, such interventions are presumably justified if the government
is acting in pursuit of policies within its authority. It is certainly possible that a
regulatory influence or intervention on the bankruptcy system might end up
being unwise as a matter of policy. If so, however, it will not be because it
improperly interferes with the role of bankruptcy law or contravenes the
structural relationship between bankruptcy and other legal or regulatory
regimes.
As Ellias and Triantis suggest, the government may occasionally use the
bankruptcy as a “long-term opportunit[y] that outweigh[s] the short-term
challenges of the bankruptcy stay and discharge.”82 As noted above, they
question whether “bankruptcy [is] the appropriate forum for regulation by
activist government executives” because it may decrease the transparency and
accountability of government actions.83 They also note that the cost of
government involvement is often borne by other private stakeholders in the
bankruptcy system.84
79
Feibelman, supra note 24, at 1408–09 (noting as well that government creditors cannot adjust to losses
as easily as private creditors).
80
See, e.g., Daniel Mandel, Tax Expenditures and Social Policy: A Primer, in SMART SUBSIDY FOR
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 28, (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Bos. & The Aspen Inst. eds., 2011), available at https://
www.bostonfed.org/publications/one-time-pubs/smart-subsidy-for-community-development.aspx.
81
See Oei, supra note 46, at 402 (“Unlike private creditors, the government plays an important role
outside of bankruptcy in providing public goods, smoothing consumption, and absorbing economic shocks.”).
82
Ellias & Triantis, supra note 11, at 512.
83
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
84
Ellias & Triantis, supra note 11, at, 547.
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The forgoing principles suggest instead that bankruptcy is often and
appropriately a forum for government action. Given the often-opaque nature of
modern regulatory practice, decisions made in the context of a bankruptcy case
are at least comparably transparent and subject to input and influence by
stakeholders.85 Furthermore, it should be expected that the cost of such action
will sometimes be borne by other stakeholders, especially when the
government’s action is in tension with bankruptcy policies that would maximize
insolvency returns for them. This can be thought of as a tax like any other cost
imposed by government action in other contexts.
These principles provide a useful perspective on various high-profile cases,
such as Purdue Pharma’s bankruptcy. The settlement of claims against the
Sacklers illustrates controversial aspects of bankruptcy practice, including thirdparty releases, the strategic use pre-bankruptcy transactions, scarce
opportunities for appellate review, and judge-shopping.86 But the settlement
should also be understood as a use of the bankruptcy system by the DOJ and
state attorneys general to police behavior within their legal and regulatory
authority. It should not be surprising or particularly controversial that their
regulatory goals should drive the bankruptcy process and perhaps be given some
additional weight in close questions like whether to extend protections to third
parties. To be sure, the settlement was not initially supported by some state
attorneys general. But that should be understood as another ordering problem
among other overlapping authorities in a federal system. In other words, if the
Purdue settlement is problematic, the problem is largely with the DOJ’s
substantive policy, not its decision to employ the bankruptcy system or its
structural role or strategy in the firm’s bankruptcy case. Similarly, it may be that
some bankruptcy protections should not be extended to third-party non-debtors.
But this is a general question of bankruptcy law and policy. If it is to be allowed
as a tool of bankruptcy law at all, then it should be available to advance
government or regulatory policy; and perhaps the government interest should be
a thumb on the scale in favor of its use in an otherwise close case.

What these foci of government influence have in common is that the financial cost, if any, of
pursuing such policy goals is borne by another claimholder in bankruptcy. Arguably, this is an
unlegislated tax or unfunded mandate, implemented in the bankruptcy reorganization plan and
imposed on one or more classes of other creditors.
Id. at 521.
85
See generally Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 3; see also, Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis:
How Derivatives Changed the “Business of Banking”, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 (2009).
86
See generally Levitin, supra note 12; see also, Jacoby, supra note 44, at 419–22.
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II. FINANCIAL REGULATION AND BANKRUPTCY
This Part further develops the conceptual framework set forth above by
focusing on one of the most important areas of interaction between bankruptcy
and the state: the relationship between bankruptcy and financial regulation and
the involvement of financial regulators in the bankruptcy system. Part II.A
describes the deep structural relationship between bankruptcy law and financial
regulation, which, if rarely examined, is an essential and mutually defining
aspect of both fields. This is because bankruptcy itself is an important part of the
architecture of financial markets.
This subset of government involvement or influence over the bankruptcy
system is ubiquitous but only occasionally observable. That opacity is partly a
function of the informality and relative lack of transparency of financial
regulation and supervision.87 It is also due to the fact that financial regulators are
most often involved in the bankruptcy system through intermediaries—the
banks they regulate and supervise and who are regularly creditors in the
bankruptcy system. When financial regulators’ involvement in bankruptcy is
observable and direct, it is often in pursuit of macro-prudential policy to promote
or restore systemic stability. Such actions tend to be controversial and sometimes
stand in significant tension with bankruptcy-specific policy.
Part II.B describes three episodes of direct regulatory involvement and
influence in a bankruptcy system: regulators’ direction of U.S. banks’ behavior
in the bankruptcies of commercial real estate borrowers during the financial
crisis of 2008–09; the U.S. government’s involvement in Chrysler’s 2009
bankruptcy; and the Reserve Bank of India’s requiring banks to initiate
insolvency cases for their largest non-performing accounts in 2017–2018.
Each of these episodes has generated some criticism of the role of
government actors and financial regulators in bankruptcy. Along with the the
recent contribution by Ellias and Triantis discussed above, this criticism
represents most of the commentary directly addressing the topic to date. Part
II.C argues that, while these interventions may be justly subject to criticism as
matters of regulatory policy, they did not contravene the structural role of
bankruptcy or insolvency in the broader landscape of financial regulation. It
generally defends “regulation driven” bankruptcy decision-making as a general
proposition, one that derives from an understanding of bankruptcy law as itself
87
See generally Lev Menand, Why Supervise Banks? The Foundations of the American Monetary
Settlement, 74 VAND. L. REV. 951 (2021) (describing the unique institutional framework and function of bank
supervision).
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a component of financial market architecture in a modern economy. As Part II.D
explains, this aspect of bankruptcy law provides useful context for evaluating
recent COVID-related proposals that would increase the involvement of
financial regulators and other government actors in the bankruptcy system.
A. The Relationship
If bankruptcy is effectively an extension or a component of almost every
other legal and regulatory regime, this is especially true with respect to financial
regulation. As with most other regulatory regimes, bankruptcy law intersects
with financial regulation in countless ways. But, in this case, the relationship
runs even deeper than might be apparent to the casual observer or from most
scholarship and commentary on bankruptcy law.
In the wake of recent international financial crises, policymakers and
scholars have grown increasingly interested in the systemic functions of
bankruptcy law as a utility-type component of the legal and regulatory
architecture of financial markets.88 This contemporary understanding of the role
and function of bankruptcy law emerged in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet
Union as various countries around the world began transitioning to market-based
economies. As Halliday & Carruthers observe, “starting at the end of the 1980s,
and throughout the 1990s, bankruptcy law became a topic of concern to major
international financial institutions, global lawmaking bodies, and international
professional associations.”89 These institutions and actors “shared a belief that
bankruptcy law, appropriately enacted and implemented, played an important
role in supporting a market economy,”90 and they promoted global standards of
insolvency and bankruptcy law.91 As a result of this ongoing effort, there has
been a discernable global convergence on institutional design for bankruptcy
and insolvency systems,92 which is largely reflected in the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law’s Legislative Guide to Insolvency
Law.93

88
HALLIDAY & CARRUTHERS, supra note 35 (noting that bankruptcy and insolvency regimes may be
properly understood as part of the legal structure of financial markets); Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of
Finance 3 (Colum. L. Sch., Working Paper No. 13-348, 2013).
89
Id. at xv “Bankruptcy law constitutes the hard budget constraints that distinguish capitalist from
command economies.” Id. at xv.
90
Id. at xxii.
91
Id. at xv–xxii.
92
Id. at 33; see Hagan, supra note 56, at 359, 360.
93
See generally U.N. GAOR, COMM ON INT’L TRADE L., LEGISLATIVE GUIDE TO INSOLVENCY, at 9–38,
U.N. Sales No. E.05.V.10 (2005), available at https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/mediadocuments/uncitral/en/05-80722_ebook.pdf. This global convergence has some local variations. HALLIDAY &
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A series of financial crises beginning in the late 1990’s, including both the
recent global financial crisis and the current COVID-related economic crisis,
have underscored for scholars and global policymakers an additional important
function of bankruptcy law as a tool for preventing and managing financial crisis
and for restoring financial stability.94 These crises have been characterized by
levels of both corporate and household over-indebtedness that threatened
financial systemic stability and, in turn, the strength and functioning of the real
economy.95 Among other things, as waves of private debtors become unable to
service their obligations, they impose losses on banks, increasing the risk of a
banking crisis. A banking crisis can in turn cause or exacerbate general
economic crises and sometimes require a government rescue, increasing the risk
of a sovereign debt crises.96
Thus, a critical function of a bankruptcy or insolvency systems is to help
insulate or rescue domestic financial systems, especially the banking system,
from destabilizing over-indebtedness in the economy. It can, for example,
provide a tool for clearing bad assets from the banks’ portfolios, thereby
improving bank capital across the system, discussed below in more detail.97
Bankruptcy or insolvency law can also help avoid the disorderly collapse of
systemically important firms98 and the broad collateral effects or contagion that
such a collapse would entail.
In sum, bankruptcy law is a necessary component of a modern financial
system, one that serves various foundational regulatory and macro-economic
CARRUTHERS, supra note 35, at 35.
94
HALLIDAY &. CARRUTHERS, supra note 35, at 3.
Although the repercussions of multinational collapses and the reconstruction of Eastern European
economies brought bankruptcy law closer to center stage, it was the Asian Financial Crisis that
finally made global actors realize that a concerted campaign was necessary to protect financial
sectors, countries, and the world economy from financial shocks.
Id.; see also Hagan, supra note 56, at 361 (“[T]he Asian crisis highlighted an important question: can a legal and
institutional framework designed to address the failure of individual enterprises also assist in resolving crises of
systemic proportions, in which a significant portion of the corporate sector is in distress?”). But see, Anthony J.
Casey, Bankruptcy & Bailouts; Subsidies & Stimulus: The Government Toolset for Responding to Market
Distress 23–25 (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst., Working Paper No. 578, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3783422 (arguing that the potentially beneficial role of bankruptcy in addressing market
distress is often over-estimated and that it is generally limited to addressing “specific financial distress”).
95
Hagan, supra note 56, at 359. Widespread underlying private over-indebtedness may, for example,
limit the space available for monetary and fiscal policies to resolve an unfolding crisis. Id. at 359–60.
96
Id. at 359.
97
See infra notes 180–83 and accompanying text.
98
See, e.g., Adam Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 485–86 (2011) (discussing the
General Motors and Chrysler bankruptcies but arguing that “bankruptcy will not be used for the cases that truly
present systemic risk”).
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functions. In most circumstances, a bankruptcy regime serves these functions
through the actions and decisions of participants within the regime as a product
or by-product of the technical design and operation of the system itself. In other
words, regulatory policies are embedded in the substance of a bankruptcy regime
and are usually deployed through the aggregate effects of individual cases and
through the ex ante incentives that it creates for households, firms, governments,
and financial institutions.99 The machinery of a bankruptcy system itself serves
crucial functions within the broader financial system as well, by facilitating the
allocation of losses in an organized and timely manner. In times of stress, a
bankruptcy regime can serve a crucial role in promoting or restoring systemic
stability, either through its operation in the aggregate or with regard to
systemically significant entities or both.
B. Three Episodes
Beyond the structural relationship between bankruptcy and financial
regulatory architecture, government and regulatory actors also act in various
ways to influence the operation of a bankruptcy system to promote financial
regulatory goals. As two of the episodes described below illustrate, perhaps the
most important if under-appreciated way that financial regulators do so is by
supervising and enforcing bank capital requirements and other banking laws and
regulations. Capital requirements, a critical pillar of bank regulation, effectively
regulate the quality and composition of banks’ loans and other assets. They help
determine a wide range of banks’ practices with regard to renegotiation,
forbearance, and collection of obligations owed to them. They sometimes
effectively require realization and allocation of losses, unclogging the system of
non-performing assets, perhaps to allow for recapitalization.100 This in turn can
influence how banks participate in the bankruptcy system as creditors in their
borrowers’ bankruptcy cases. Through this channel, banking regulators can
influence or direct the practices of private banks in the operation of the
bankruptcy system. This type of engagement by banking regulators with the
bankruptcy system is usually in the deep background, routine, and in pursuit of
micro-prudential policies to promote the safety and soundness of particular
banks.
As the Chrysler episode described below illustrates, regulators sometimes
engage with the bankruptcy system even more actively to pursue macroprudential goals, perhaps to resolve systemically significant commercial firms
99
100

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
Hagan, supra note 56, at 359.
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or to address other systemic risks to the financial system.101 These interactions
between financial regulation, micro- and macro-economic policies, and
bankruptcy law represent another dimension along which to evaluate the longstanding debates among bankruptcy scholars about institutional design.102 They
can also help inform our understanding of the relationship between a bankruptcy
system and other regulatory regimes, including direct interventions from other
regulatory domains in the operation of the bankruptcy system.
1. Commercial Real Estate and the Financial Crisis of 2008–09
In the years leading up to the financial crisis of 2008–09, commercial real
estate loans, which include loans for construction and development, were a
growing and particularly important component of secured lending by U.S.
banks.103 As Sarah Woo recounts in a careful study of this episode, banking
regulators became increasingly concerned that the accumulated concentration of
commercial loan in banks’ portfolios—and thus across the banking system—
posed an increasingly heightened risk, greater than the isolated risk of failure of
these loans when considered individually.104 The regulators began to impose a
series of “specific regulatory measures that shaped the reactions of banks in
dealing with their portfolios of loans and thereby their position as secured
creditors vis-à-vis debtors. These regulatory measures . . . [included] intensive
monitoring, which centered on capital adequacy and another key component:
concentration risk.”105 As Woo relates:
In February 2008, the FDIC’s Office of Inspector General released a
report concluding that commercial real estate concentrations had
“reached record levels that could create safety and soundness
concerns.” In response, the FDIC . . . strongly recommended that banks
with such concentrations “increase capital to provide ample protection
from unexpected losses if market conditions [were to] deteriorate
further.” . . . Throughout 2008, banks were subject to extensive on-site
supervision to monitor their credit concentrations and establish
mechanisms to report internal concentration limits.106

101
See Patricia McCoy, Countercyclical Regulation and Its Challenges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1181, 1182 n.1
(noting that macro-prudential tools, like countercyclical policies “serve macroprudential purposes because they
apply to all financial institutions within a class based on macro indicators, without regard to an individual firm’s
financial condition”).
102
Liscow, supra note 35 (arguing for institutional design changes in bankruptcy law to promote countercyclical macro-economic outcomes, perhaps the clearest recent example of precisely this type of analysis).
103
Woo, Regulatory Bankruptcy, supra note 11, at 1628.
104
Id. at 1631–32.
105
Id. at 1629.
106
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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As the crisis began, the banking sector was still effectively over-exposed to
the commercial real estate sector, which “attracted intense regulatory
scrutiny.”107 One of Woo’s important contributions to our understanding of this
episode is data she reported about the behavior of banks108 in the bankruptcies
of commercial real estate firms during this period. In particular, she studied the
instances of banks moving to lift the automatic stay in these bankruptcies,
presumably to be able to begin foreclosure proceedings to divest from their
exposures to the underlying real estate assets.109 She found a notable increase in
such actions by banks in the period of 2007-09 over the period of 2004-06.110
Furthermore, she found that this increase was driven by banks’ concern
about the risk of concentration of commercial real estate loans in their portfolios
rather than individualized assessment of the liquidation value of the underlying
real estate assets in each particular case.111 This concern, she found, was
“regulation-driven.”112 As she explained:
a rational secured creditor, when faced with a bankruptcy case, would
normally be hard-pressed to choose liquidation of incomplete
residential developments and settle for repayment from the low as-is
liquidation value . . . . The main takeaway is that an exogenous factor
clearly influences secured creditors to favor liquidation when
reorganization is preferable; this paper identifies financial regulation
as a major suspect.113

Although she did not report evidence that banking regulators had specifically
or expressly directed banks to move to lift the automatic stay in their debtors’
bankruptcy, she “provided the first evidence, to the best of the author’s
knowledge, that the financial regulatory regime affects creditors’ behavior in
bankruptcy.”114
Unfortunately, it appears that this policy of pushing banks to divest from
commercial real estate assets exacerbated the underlying problem posed by their
concentration in the banking system. The actions of banks in response to this
regulatory pressure, including what Woo termed “bankruptcy contagion,”115
107

Id. at 1618.
See id. at 1628–31.
109
See id.
110
Id. at 1641.
111
Id. at 1646.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 1652–53.
114
Id. at 1646.
115
Id. at 1655 (“This process deserves the term bankruptcy contagion because the exogenous factor
affecting bankruptcy proceedings–the microprudential regulatory regime–is not an idiosyncratic factor, but
108
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further depressed the value of those assets, in turn further eroding bank
capital.116 This assessment was quickly made as well by the banking
regulators,117 and they reversed their regulatory policy.118
2. The Chrysler Bankruptcy
In April of 2009, Chrysler LLC and its subsidiaries, which together
comprised one of the world’s largest manufacturers and distributors of
automobiles, filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York.119 At
that time, the company had approximately 55,000 hourly and salaried employees
in the U.S. and abroad.120 In 2008, it had a net operating loss of nearly $17
billion.121 By that time, the company had been struggling to maintain its position
in the automotive industry for many years and had been facing acute financial
challenges for many months. It had merged with Daimler-Benz, the German auto
firm, in 1998, and in May 2007 that firm sold an eighty percent stake to Cerberus
Capital Management, a U.S. private equity firm.122 Around that time, the firm
initiated an effort to restructure its operations and to develop a strategic
partnership with another auto firm to manufacture more energy efficient
vehicles.123 Although the firm approached numerous possible partners, it was
unable to reach agreement on such a partnership.124 This effort took on greater
urgency in 2008, first because of a spike in gas prices that summer,125 and then
rather a systemic factor that affects the banking industry all at once.”).
116
Id. at 1656–57.
117
Id. at 1653–54.
118
Id. at 1656.
[I]n reaction to bankruptcy contagion, U.S. regulators by the end of 2009 issued a policy
statement on commercial real estate loans, making clear that prudent workouts are “often in the
best interest of the financial institution and the borrower,” and that loans should not be subject to
adverse classification and write-downs “solely because the value of the underlying collateral has
declined to an amount that is less than the loan balance.”
Id.
119
In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 87 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). General Motors, another major U.S.
automobile manufacturer, filed for bankruptcy as well and employed a similar strategy as Chrysler’s, following
the Chrysler court’s approval of the approach. See Roe & Skeel, supra note 25, at 731 (citing In re Gen. Motors
Corp., 407 B.R. 463,497–98 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)).
120
In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. at 88.
121
Id. at 89.
122
DaimlerChrysler Dawns, CNN: MONEY (May 7, 1998), https://money.cnn.com/1998/05/07/deals/
benz/; Bill Vlasic & Nelson D. Schwartz, Chrysler and Fiat Have Hopes for Happy Relationship, N.Y. TIMES
(May 4, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/05/business/05auto.html.
123
In re Chrysler, LLC, 405 B.R. at 90.
124
See id. at 90–92.
125
Associated Press, Gas Prices Put Detroit Big Three Crisis Mode, NBC NEWS (May 30, 2008),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/24896359/ns/business-autos/t/gas-prices-put-detroit-big-three-crisis-mode/.
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as the global financial crisis of 2008-09 began to affect the real economy and
especially the availability of credit to the company and to consumers.126
In late 2008, Chrysler borrowed $4 billion from the U.S. Treasury, pursuant
to Treasury’s Troubled Asset Repurchase Program (“TARP”).127 Significantly,
the terms of the loan required Chrysler to develop and submit to Treasury a plan
“showing that it was able to achieve and sustain long-term viability, energy
efficiency, rationalization of costs and competitiveness in the U.S. marketplace
. . ., which would indicate Chrysler’s ability to repay the TARP Financing.”128
In January of 2009, Chrysler reached an agreement for a “strategic alliance” with
Fiat, in which Fiat would acquire a stake in Chrysler, and the following month
Chrysler submitted to Treasury its viability plan proposing the arrangement with
Fiat.129 President Barack Obama created a task force to evaluate Chrysler’s
viability plan and, subsequently, to help negotiate the terms of the Chrysler-Fiat
alliance and the process for establishing it.130 This process involved, among
other things, reaching settlements with its current and retired employees;
obtaining consent from Chrysler’s senior secured creditors; and creating a third
company (commonly known as New Chrysler), which acquired almost all of
Chrysler’s assets and a portion of its liabilities.131 The new company transferred
$2 billion to (old) Chrysler, which was used to pay its senior secured creditors
approximately twenty-nine percent of their claims.132 Fiat would acquire a
twenty percent stake in the new Chrysler, with the right to obtain up to thirtyone percent; the company’s retirees’ association would have a fifty-five percent
stake; and the governments of the U.S. and Canada would have eight and two
percent stakes, respectively.133
Together, the task force, Chrysler, and Fiat decided that the transaction
would be conducted pursuant to a bankruptcy filing by Chrysler, contingent on
the U.S. Treasury’s willingness to fund the transaction and the restructuring.134
Chrysler filed for bankruptcy on April 30, 2009 and, that day, Chrysler, Fiat and
New Chrysler formally entered into their agreement for the sale of Chrysler to

126

See In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. at 90.
Id. at 89–90.
128
Id. at 90.
129
Id. at 90, 91.
130
Id. at 91.
131
Id. at 92–98.
132
Roe & Skeel, supra note 25, at 733.
133
In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. at 92.
134
See Roe & Skeel, supra note 25, at 760 (suggesting that the U.S. Treasury determined that Chrysler
would be rescued through a bankruptcy process); In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. at 91.
127
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New Chrysler.135 The next day, Chrysler filed a motion in bankruptcy court to
schedule a hearing on the transaction.136 Three of the holders of Chrysler’s
senior secured claims, accounting for $42 million of the $6.9 billion in those
claims, objected to the sale.137
The sale of all of Chrysler’s assets to New Chrysler was proposed pursuant
to Section 363 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,138 which provides that a debtor or
trustee “after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the
ordinary course of business, property of the estate.”139 Generally, as in the
Chrysler case, sales of assets pursuant to Section 363 are proposed at the very
early stages of a bankruptcy case, well before a reorganization plan has been
negotiated or proposed.140 Courts routinely authorize the sale of assets of the
bankruptcy estate out of the ordinary course of business under such
circumstances.141 Most often, such assets are discrete items or portions of the
estate.142 Those assets are sold and the proceeds from the sale become part of
the estate and are distributed to creditors pursuant to a reorganization plan in
chapter 11 or liquidation in chapter 7.143
Sometimes, however, corporate debtors seek to sell essentially the entire
firm pursuant to section 363, and the estate is then comprised primarily or
exclusively of the proceeds of the sale.144 In some of these cases, the newly
acquired firm voluntarily adopts some portion of the obligations of the debtor in
bankruptcy, leaving other creditors to claim only whatever they may recover in
the debtor’s bankruptcy proceedings.145 Recognizing that such transactions are
occasionally efficient, courts will approve them but generally require a sound
business justification for the sale, notice to affected parties, a fair price, and a
good faith sale procedure.146 As Mark Roe and David Skeel have explained,
135

In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. at 92.
Id. at 97.
137
Id. at 93.
138
See Roe & Skeel, supra note 25, at 751.
139
11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2018). A debtor or trustee is furthermore authorized to “use, sell, or lease . . .
property of the estate in the ordinary course of business without notice or a hearing.” Id. § 363(c) (2018).
140
See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862 (2014).
141
See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2018).
142
Jacoby & Janger, supra note 140, at 874–76.
143
See Roe & Skeel, supra note 25, at 737.
144
See Jacoby &. Janger, supra note 140, at 876–80 (discussing In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063 (2d
Cir. 1983)).
145
Such an arrangement can enable the parties to benefit from the debtor’s power under the Bankruptcy
Code to sell assets free and clear of liens or other claims and then effectively reorganize the debtor’s firm outside
of the process otherwise required under chapter 11.
146
See Roe & Skeel, supra note 25, at 739 (quoting Scott D. Cousins, Chapter 11 Asset Sales, 27 DEL. J.
136
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these requirements are “safeguards [that] can reconcile a Section 363 sale with
core protections of [chapter 11]: judicial valuation, creditor consent, and a
contested auction.”147
In Chrysler’s proposed sale of all of its assets to New Chrysler, the
bankruptcy court judge and the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals both found
that these conditions were met.148 Furthermore, the bankruptcy court found that
the objecting creditors effectively consented to the transaction in deciding that
Chrysler could sell its assets free and clear of liens and other interests pursuant
to Section 363(f).149 The court found that they had consented as participants in
a large secured loan agreement.150 Their administrative agent had approved
Chrysler’s transaction with Fiat, and creditors holding over ninety percent of the
secured loan amount outstanding voted to approve the administrative agent’s
decision.151 These senior secured claims were secured by all of Chrysler’s assets;
as a practical matter, they were the only creditors who had a claim on the
proceeds of the sale of the firm.152
The creditors objecting to Chrysler’s sale to New Chrysler questioned the
legitimacy of this vote by the senior secured claimants.153 Among the consenting
creditors were some of the country’s largest banks who together held over
seventy percent of the loan amount outstanding under the lending agreement.154
These banks were all recipients of investments by the U.S. Treasury pursuant to
TARP.155 In other words, these banks owed significant obligations to the major
proponent of Chrysler’s proposed sale and the firm’s largest single creditor, the
U.S. Treasury, under terms that gave Treasury significant potential direct power

CORP. L. 835, 839–40 (2002)).
The Second Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals has articulated various factors to assess in determining
whether there is a sound business justification for a § 363(b) sale. These include: “the
proportionate value of the asset to the estate as a whole[;] the amount of elapsed time since the
filing[;] the likelihood that a plan of reorganization will be proposed and confirmed in the near
future[;] . . . and . . . whether the asset is increasing or decreasing in value.
In re Chrysler, LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 95 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel
Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983)).
147
Roe & Skeel, supra note 25, at 739.
148
In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. at 94–100, 119; In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009).
149
In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. at 113.
150
Id. at 102.
151
Id.
152
See id. at 101–02.
153
Id. at 103.
154
Id. at 89–90.
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See Roe & Skeel, supra note 25, at 743.
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over them.156 The objecting creditors essentially argued that the government had,
and had exercised, the power to direct these creditors to consent to the
transaction. The Court dismissed this argument for lack of evidentiary
support.157
3. The “RBI 12”
The Reserve Bank of India’s (“RBI”) involvement in that country’s
bankruptcy and insolvency system is one of the most dramatic of recent
examples of regulatory intervention in an insolvency or bankruptcy system
anywhere around the globe.158 In May of 2016, India adopted a new
comprehensive Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (“IBC”).159 The IBC’s
provisions for business debtors, which were notified in August 2016,160 created
a new regime for corporate reorganizations and liquidations, replacing a number
of pre-existing laws.161 Very briefly, the regime is structured as a gateway
restructuring chapter with a liquidation chapter backstop.162 Cases can be
initiated by creditors or debtors,163 but the design of the IBC effectively ensures
that creditors will generally do so. Firms that enter the system are taken over by
an insolvency professional and a committee of “financial” creditors who have a
few months—180 days, which can be extended to 270 days—to specify and
approve a plan of reorganization. In practice, such plans usually provide for a
sale of the firm as a going concern pursuant to a bidding process.164 If a plan is

156

Id. at 743.
See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
158
See, e.g., Government interference undermines RBI’s functional autonomy: Viral Acharya, THE ECON.
TIMES (OCT. 27, 2018, 8:56 AM), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/banking/
government-interference-undermines-rbis-functional-autonomy-viral-acharya/articleshow/66383480.cms?
from=mdr.
159
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, (India).
160
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, supra note 159, at Part II, https://ibbi.gov.in//webadmin/pdf/
legalframwork/2017/Jul/Notificationdated05.08.2016.pdf.; https://ibbi.gov.in//webadmin/pdf/legalframwork/
2017/Jul/Notification_22092016_1.pdf. As with other legislative acts, the IBC provides that, “It shall come into
force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint.” Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code, supra note 159, at 1.3. The Official Gazette, published by the Government of India Press,
is generally used by the government to publish official notices. See THE GAZETTE OF INDIA,
http://egazette.nic.in/.
161
Adam Feibelman, Legal Shock or False Start: The Future of India’s New Consumer Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Regime, 93 AM. BANKR. L.J. 429, 442 & n.78 (2019).
162
Id. at 443.
163
Id.
164
Anirudh Burman, India’s Sustained Economic Recovery Will Require Changes to Its Bankruptcy
Law 8 (Apr. 2021) (Carnegie India working paper), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Indias_Sustained_
Economic_Recovery_Carnegie_v1_web.pdf.
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not approved within the allotted time, the firm is to be liquidated pursuant to the
IBC.165
Thus, as designed, the IBC provides that a firm will generally enter the
insolvency and bankruptcy system if at least one creditor decides to trigger the
process, and the firm’s fate will be determined by a subset of its creditors, subject
to the substantive rules of the IBC, with relatively limited interference by an
adjudicating authority.166 To implement this new regime, the IBC created a
number of new major institutional entities and actors, the most important of
which is the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (“Board”).167 The Board
is responsible for adopting rules and regulations to implement numerous aspects
of the new regime and for supervising many of its components.168
The IBC was drafted and enacted in a surprisingly short period of time for
such a consequential and comprehensive legal regime.169 The drafters of the IBC
and policymakers who enacted it had two primary motivations for adopting the
new IBC, both of which drove many of the important design choices that shaped
it, and both of which reflect the unique policy and regulatory functions of
bankruptcy law described above in Parts I.A and II.A. The first of these goals
was somewhat conventional, i.e., that the new system would increase, clarify, or
accelerate lenders’ returns from their debtors who experience financial
troubles.170 Policymakers hoped that if the new system could succeed in this
regard, it would promote the development of domestic credit markets, especially
the domestic corporate bond market.171 They also hoped that the new regime
would help attract foreign investors by improving and clarifying the legal
environment for firms or projects they might invest in as well as their ability to
recover capital if those firms or projects fail.

165

Feibelman, supra note 161, at 443.
See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
167
Feibelman, supra note 161, at 437–38.
168
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, supra note 159, at §§ 188–198. Among other things, the Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Board of India is charged with regulating and supervising newly created insolvency
professionals and issuing rules and regulations related to these professionals and that implement numerous other
substantive aspects of the Code. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, supra note 159, at §§ 196, 240. The Board is
also responsible for gathering and disseminating data related to the new insolvency and bankruptcy system. The
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 196. (India). The powers of the Board are “subject to the general
direction of the central government.” Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, supra note 159, at § 196.
169
Feibelman, supra note 161, at 435.
170
Id. at 457.
171
Report of the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee Volume I: Rationale and Design, at 33–34 (2015)
available at http://dea.gov.in/sites/default/files/BLRCReportVol1_04112015.pdf.
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Policymakers’ second, and perhaps more acute, motivation for enacting the
IBC was to address a specific and intractable problem of nonperforming assets
that had accumulated and persisted in the country’s banking system.172 At that
time, non-performing assets had reached the level of nearly five percent of bank
assets in the country.173 Policymakers hoped that the IBC would enable the longneeded resolution or rehabilitation of the firms that owed banks these nonperforming loans and thus clear these assets from the banks’ balance sheets,
helping to improve the capital position of the entire system.174 As a result of
these related goals, the regime for corporate debtors was expressly designed to
improve the speed and predictability of allocating losses from commercial
ventures, either through expeditious restructuring of debts or liquidation.175 The
choice to maximize the role of creditors and to reduce the role of judicial officers
in making critical decisions throughout the system is an important feature of this
design.176
In June of 2017, less than a year after the IBC went into effect, the RBI
directed banks under its supervision to force firms owing the largest nonperforming loans in the banking system into insolvency.177 Specifically, an
internal advisory committee of the RBI recommended that banks should initiate
insolvency cases for all debtors who owed more than 5,000 rupees crore (50
billion rupees, approximately $720 million) if more than sixty percent of their
debt was non-performing.178 At the time, this criteria applied to 12 accounts
owed to Indian banks that represented roughly a quarter of the gross nonperforming assets in the country’s banking system.179 Most of the firms
172

Feibelman, supra note 161, at 457.
See Vastal Khullar, The Rise of Non-Performing Assets in India, THE PRS BLOG (May 11, 2016),
http://www.prsindia.org/theprsblog/the-rise-of-non-performing-assets-in-india.
174
See, e.g., Resolve 55 Accounts In Six Months Under Bankruptcy Code: RBI to Banks, THE ECON. TIMES
(June 22, 2017, 6:34 PM), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/banking/resolve-55accounts-in-six-months-under-bankruptcy-code-rbi-to-banks/articleshow/59271821.cms.
175
Report of the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee supra note 171, at 14–15.
176
See, e.g., id. at 12 (“In the past, laws in India have brought arms of the government (legislature,
executive or judiciary) into this question [of how to resolve a commercial firm in financial distress]. This has
been strictly avoided by the Committee. The appropriate disposition of a defaulting firm is a business decision,
and only the creditors should make it.”).
177
See Press Release, Reserve Bank of India, RBI identifies Accounts for Reference by Banks under the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) (June 13, 2017) (https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PressRelease/PDFs/
PR3363482A1FF9229F4B9A92EA0090D5D71518PDF); see also Khullar, supra note 173.
178
Press Release, Reserve Bank of India, RBI Identifies Accounts for Reference by Banks Under the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) (June 13, 2017) (https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PressRelease/PDFs/
PR3363482A1FF9229F4B9A92EA0090D5D71518.PDF).
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RBI Lists 12 NPA Accounts for Insolvency Proceedings, THE HINDU BUSINESS LINE: MONEY &
BANKING, available at https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/money-and-banking/rbi-lists-12-npa-accounts-forinsolvency-proceedings/article9726354.ece (last updated Jan. 12, 2018).
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representing those twelve accounts were in the steel, metals, and construction
industries, and all had been through at least one unsuccessful restructuring
effort.180 As the Governor of the RBI stated at the time:
[t]he size and nature of the NPA problem necessitated concomitant
measures to signal intent and commitment of the Government and the
Reserve Bank to meet the challenge squarely. The IBC was in place
but the required action in respect of the large stressed accounts was not
forthcoming on the part of banks . . . . Part of the inertia may have to
do with the initial days of the IBC; but part of it was also the typical
(and severe) agency and moral hazard problems of not resolving NPAs
when the banking sector is majorly government-owned.181

Soon thereafter, in July and August 2017, the relevant banks initiated
insolvency cases for the firms representing 11 of these accounts; the twelfth was
initiated in May 2018.182 At that point, India’s new insolvency and bankruptcy
system was still very much in the initial phase of implementation.183 These large
cases proved to be—and some continue to be—important and challenging tests
for the new regime, providing numerous occasions for institution building and
refinement as well as some substantive legal reforms.184 These cases quickly
became the focus of significant public attention, causing the new insolvency and
bankruptcy to become and remain a very salient topic of public interest and
concern.185
By August of 2018—well beyond the time frame set forth under the IBC,
after which firms should be transferred to the liquidation process—resolution
plans had been approved by adjudicating authorities for four of the initial twelve,
and the other cases were ongoing. Meanwhile, in February of 2018, the RBI
published a circular expanding its policy of requiring banks to initiate cases

180
Joshua Felman, Varun Marwah, & Anjali Sharma, presentation at IBBI—IGIDR Conference on
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Reforms: The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) - 12 Cases Under the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code (IBC) (Aug. 3, 2018), available at https://ifrogs.org/EVENTS/IBC_Confference/
PRESENTATIONS/sl_201808_watchingRBI12_Anjali.pdf.
181
Urjit R. Patel, Governor, Reserve Bank of India, Speech at the Inaugural Session of the “National
Conference on Insolvency and Bankruptcy: Changing Paradigm” (Aug. 19, 2017).
182
Pragya Srivastava, ‘Dirty Dozen’ NPA resolution, FIN. EXPRESS (July 26, 2018), available at https://
www.financialexpress.com/economy/dirty-dozen-npa-resolution-4-done-8-under-process-heres-ibc-updatefor-12-big-accounts/1258908/.
183
Ajay Shah, Sequencing Issues in Building Jurisprudence: The Problems of Large Bankruptcy Cases,
THE LEAP BLOG (July 7, 2018), https://blog.theleapjournal.org/2018/07/sequencing-issues-in-building.html.
184
See Ajay Shah & Susan Thomas, The Indian Bankruptcy Reform: The State of the Art, 2018, THE LEAP
BLOG (Dec. 22, 2018), https://blog.theleapjournal.org/2018/12/the-indian-bankruptcy-reform-state-of.html. See
also Shah, supra note 183.
185
See Shah, supra note 183; Shah & Thomas, supra note 184.
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against firms that owe non-performing loans.186 Among other things, the RBI
announced at that time that banks must initiate insolvency proceedings against
firms with loans over 2,000 rupees crore (20 billion rupees, roughly $288
million) within 180 days after a default if a resolution plan has not otherwise
been implemented.187
In April of 2019, in the case of Dharani Sugars and Chemicals v. Union of
India, the Supreme Court of India found the RBI’s policy announced in the
February 2018 circular to be unconstitutional.188 In brief, the RBI had issued the
relevant part of the circular pursuant to sections 35A and 35AA of the Banking
Regulation Act of 1949.189 Section 35A, part of the original Act sets forth broad
powers of the RBI over the banks it regulates; in dicta, the Supreme Court of
India noted that, by itself, that section could have authorized the RBI to direct
banks to initiate insolvency cases against their borrowers.190 But sections 35AA
were added to the Act by the Central Government pursuant to an ordinance
amending the Act on May 4, 2017, after the IBC was enacted.191 Section 35AA
provides that Central Government may “authorize the RBI to issue directions to
any banking company or banking companies when it comes to initiating the
insolvency resolution process under the provisions of the [IBC].”192 On May 5,
2017, the Ministry of Finance formally gave the RBI this authority.193
In Dharani, the Court held, first, that section 35AA itself is constitutional.194
But it found that the RBI’s circular of February 2018 was not constitutional and,
186
Reserve Bank of India, Circular on Resolution of Stressed Assets—Revised Framework, RBI/201718/131 (Issued on Feb. 12, 2018), https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Notification/PDFs/131DBRCEC9D8FEED
1C467C9FC15C74D01745A7.PDF.
187
Id.
188
Dharani Sugars and Chemicals v. Union of India, (2019) 5 SCC 480 (India).
189
Reserve Bank of India, Circular on Resolution of Stressed Assets, supra note 186.
190
Dharani Sugars and Chemicals v. Union of India, 5 SCC at 516–18 (“A cursory reading of Section 35A
makes it clear that there is nothing in the aforesaid provision which would indicate that the power of the RBI to
give directions, when it comes to the [IBC], cannot be so given.”).
191
Debopam Dutta & Vishesh Arora, Supreme Court Strikes Down RBI’s Framework On Resolution Of
Stressed Assets, Argus Partners (May 2, 2019), https://www.mondaq.com/india/financial-services/802852/
supreme-court-strikes-down-rbi39s-framework-on-resolution-of-stressed-assets.
192
Dharani Sugars and Chemicals v. Union of India, 5 SCC at 521.
193
Ministry of Finance, S.O.1435(E) (issued on May 5, 2015) (India).

In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 35AA of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10
of 1949), the Central Government hereby authorizes the RBI to issue such directions to any
banking company or banking companies which may be considered necessary to initiate
insolvency resolution process in respect of a default, under the provisions of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
Id.
194

Dharani Sugars and Chemicals v. Union of India, 5 SCC at 506–07.
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as a consequence, “all actions taken under the said circular, including actions by
which the [IBC] has been triggered must fall along with the said circular.”195
The Court found that section 35AA required that the RBI receive authorization
from the Central Government to force banks to initiate IBC proceedings against
their debtors196 and that the government only authorized the RBI to do so with
respect to specific defaults related to specific borrowers.197
Thus, India’s Central Government has the power to direct banks to initiate
insolvency proceedings against their borrowers, and it has extended that power
to RBI, but only in specific cases, not as a general policy. It arguably remains an
open question whether the RBI’s directive to banks in 2017 to initiate
proceedings against the firms holding the twelve largest non-performing
accounts would pass muster as specific directives or whether those early
directives might also be subject to the same fate as the RBI’s February 2018
circular.198 Furthermore, on June 7, the RBI issued a new circular to replace the
February 2018 circular. The new circular increases provisioning requirements
for loans that remain in default, require banks to resolve non-performing loans
over 2000 rupees crore within 180 days, and gives banks the discretion to initiate
insolvency or bankruptcy cases against their debtors “within 30 days of a
default.”199 While this policy does not require banks to initiate insolvency
proceedings, it is clearly designed to create regulatory pressure to do so and to
thereby steer banks in that direction, a striking example of the “regulatory
bankruptcy” that Woo observed in the U.S. during the previous financial crisis.

195

Id. at 564.
Id. at 524–25. Notably, the Court found that Banking Regulation Act also authorizes the Central
Government to do this on its own. Id.
197
Id. at 546.
196

[I]t is clear that the RBI can only direct banking institutions to move under the Insolvency Code
if two conditions precedent are specified, namely, (i) that there is a Central Government
authorisation [sic] to do so; and (ii) that it should be in respect of specific defaults. The Section,
therefore, by necessary implication, prohibits this power from being exercised in any manner
other than the manner set out in Section 35AA.
Id.; see also Manu Sebastian, Authorization From Central Govt Necessary For RBI To Direct Insolvency Process
Against Stressed Assets: SC, LIVE LAW (April 2, 2019), https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/authorizationcentral-govt-necessary-rbi-to-insolvency-process-against-stressed-assets-144019.
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4. Summary
Mapping these episodes to the typology from Part I, Woo’s account of
financial regulators directing or influencing banks’ behavior in bankruptcy
during the financial crisis of 2008–09 is an important illustration of a ubiquitous
and routine but often unobserved influence of regulators on the bankruptcy
system. In this case, the influence is not upon the debtor in bankruptcy, but upon
other stakeholders: banks that the regulators supervise. The RBI’s directives to
require banks in India to initiate bankruptcy proceedings against their debtors
with large non-performing loans is another example of this type of regulatory
influence on the bankruptcy system. In that case, the intervention was not routine
but starkly observable. The creation of the IBC itself exemplifies a two-step
process in the intersection of bankruptcy and financial regulation; the law was
adopted largely to help address non-performing loans in the country’s banking
sector and then the RBI stepped in to prompt this function by requiring banks to
initiate insolvency cases.
The Chrysler episode reflects a number of modes in which the government
can influence and engage with the bankruptcy system. As an initial matter, the
government effectively directed the bankruptcy filing itself. The initial loan
from Treasury and the participation of the government task force set conditions
which steered Chrysler to conduct its transaction with Fiat through a bankruptcy
process. And the bankruptcy filing appears to have been a condition of Treasury
for its financial support for the transaction. The government’s role as a pre- and
post-petition creditor probably gave it sufficient leverage to play a prominent or
dominant role in determining the process and outcome. In exercising this
leverage, the government was not motivated primarily to recover its financial
stake, but to advance its regulatory concerns. It is also possible that Chrysler’s
secured creditors consented to Chrysler’s proposed bankruptcy sale to New
Chrysler at least in part because of the leverage the government had over them
as TARP recipients.
C. Criticism
Although much has been written about various aspects of these episodes,
surprisingly little work has specifically examined the government’s intervention
in the bankruptcy or insolvency system in each case. The few writers who have
directly addressed this aspect of these episodes have been critical of the
government’s involvement. Their views can fairly be said to represent the
current conventional wisdom on the matter.
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Woo’s account of the U.S. banking regulators pushing banks to divest from
commercial real estate exposure in the mid-2000’s is primarily a descriptive one.
Woo also explains how this influence on the bankruptcy system by regulators is
in tension with existing strands of bankruptcy theory. Although it was not the
primary aim of her study, Woo left no doubt that she was critical of the
government’s action in this episode, and she advanced a normative view on
regulatory driven decision-making in bankruptcy. She emphasized the risks of
such activity, especially to the extent that it caused parties to make decisions that
were not determined by their own direct economic or financial interests. It was,
in her words, a “misguided attempt[] to use regulatory power . . ., interfering
with investment expectations and diminishing asset values.”200
Roe and Skeel are much more adamant in their objections to the
government’s role in the Chrysler bankruptcy.201 In general, they are highly
critical of the government’s involvement in Chrysler’s use of the Section 363
sale and sub rosa reorganization; they compare the government unfavorably to
dominant creditors in the abusive equity receiverships of the early 20th
Century.202 In that context, they are particularly concerned about the possibility
that the government employed its power over Chrysler’s largest secured
creditors to effectively cause them to consent to the deal, undermining an
important check on the potential dangers of the type of maneuver employed in
the case. According to Roe and Skeel, these creditors were “beholden to the U.S.
Treasury” and their votes to consent to Chrysler’s sale to New Chrysler were
“tainted” such that they would be designated as a bad-faith vote in a formal
chapter 11 proceeding.203 As they write:
There’s another, more severe, way to look at the big banks’ votes. One
or more of these banks could plausibly be viewed as controlled by the
U.S. Treasury at the time . . . .
....
. . . If the Treasury was a controlling person of one or more the major
banks, how should we look at the banks’ consent? We’d then have to
see Chrysler’s major bankruptcy lender as controlling the votes of
Chrysler’s major prebankruptcy creditors, on a plan the lender itself
designed. Normally this conflict is reason for serious concern.204
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As noted above,205 the bankruptcy court had briefly addressed this argument,
also made by the objecting creditors, and dismissed it as “without any
evidentiary support” and “mere speculation and without merit.”206 Roe and
Skeel criticize this as a “weak, possibly naive standard.”207
Given the significance of the action at the time and in retrospect, it is
surprising how little critical assessment there has been of the RBI’s move to
push banks to initiate insolvency cases in 2018-19. There has been some
commentary on the wisdom of the policy and some critical analysis of the legal
basis of the RBI’s actions. Its actions have been criticized, for example, as a
misstep on the road to building capacity for the new insolvency and bankruptcy
system.208 The particular policy of the RBI’s February 2018 circular was
criticized in the litigation leading to the Dharani opinion. The debtor argued, for
example, that setting a relatively rigid policy for all accounts meeting the
circular’s criteria was over-inclusive and did not allow for unique circumstances
in particular cases that might make an insolvency case inadvisable.209 Yet these
concerns did not touch upon the precise question of whether the RBI should
exercise this type of involvement in the insolvency system in general or to what
extent. There has been little other public discussion in India on the merits of the
general authority given to the Central Government and, by delegation, to the
RBI, to interfere in creditors’ decisions about whether to initiate insolvency
proceedings for their debtors.
Bhargavi Zaveri has provided one of the few direct assessments of the
Central Government’s ordinance amending the Banking Regulation Act and
adding Section 35AA. Specifically, she has questioned whether the use of an
ordinance rather than parliamentary law-making was warranted and has argued
that the amendment has the effect of “enhanc[ing] the powers of the Central
Government vis-a-vis the banking regulator.”210 Furthermore, in criticizing the
ordinance and the particular policy imposed by RBI’s February 2018 circular,
Zaveri writes “[s]ince liberalization, the overarching regulatory philosophy has
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See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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been to reduce state intervention in commerce. The ordinance is a backward step
in this arduous journey.”211
As noted above, Ellias and Triantis have also expressed concern about
aggressive government involvement in the bankruptcy system as an end-run
around constraints to government authority and an opaque means for executive
policy-making.212 In particular, they worry that it is harder to hold government
actors accountable for their actions in the bankruptcy system and that bankruptcy
judges are not well equipped to make non-bankruptcy policy decisions.
In contrast to this small but growing body of commentary, this Article argues
that government involvement or “activism” in the bankruptcy system is a natural
manifestation of the structural relationship between bankruptcy and the rest of
the government’s legal and regulatory apparatus. Such government involvement
in the bankruptcy system should be subject to the same careful and critical
assessment as would be any government policy or action. But the use of
bankruptcy as a tool of government influence and authority, in and of itself,
should be understood as an intended product of the institutional relationship
between bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy law and the basic ordering between
them.
D. Recent Pandemic Proposals
Setting aside the general merits of the pandemic-related bankruptcy
proposals, many of them would likely represent the most dramatic and
systematic government involvement in the U.S. bankruptcy system in modern
history. It is surprising, therefore, that this aspect of their proposals has not been
noted or evaluated as a matter of bankruptcy policy. While those proposals may
seem to have been rendered moot by the subsequent economic recovery, they
warrant continued attention. Unfortunately, it is fair to assume that other crises
will emerge, and these efforts to anticipate the role of the bankruptcy system in
response will likely be valuable. Furthermore, in any event, these proposals are
useful and illuminating for what they reveal about our current understanding
about the role of the bankruptcy system and its relationship to other policy
responses to financial distress.
This section examines in particular the role of government actors that would
be involved in some of these proposals. It addresses two types of proposals in
particular: the proposals to have the government, through the Treasury or the
211
212
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See supra notes 16–22 and accompanying text.
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Federal Reserve, provide funds for debtor-in-possession financing213 and the
proposal to condition any financial support to firms from the government on the
recipient filing for bankruptcy.214
These proposals were motivated in part by the concern that there may not be
sufficient financial resources available for firms in bankruptcy if filings increase
substantially.215 Such financing is generally essential for firms to sustain
themselves during their bankruptcy cases and to transition or bridge to their postbankruptcy operations. It is thus an essential resource for allowing the
bankruptcy system to perform its basic functions of determining which firms
should be reorganized and then facilitating their reorganization.216 Currently, a
handful of large banks provide most of the DIP financing in the U.S., with nonbank institutions providing a growing portion.217
Some writers proposed that the government should directly provide DIP
financing to firms in bankruptcy, with some proposals envisioning a facility like
the ones created under the CARES Act.218 This would presumably require some
reforms to the existing legal framework because the Federal Reserve Act
prohibits the Federal Reserve from providing financing to firms in
bankruptcy.219 Peter Conti-Brown and David Skeel have proposed having the
Federal Reserve create a facility for lending to banks who would then provide
DIP financing to firms in bankruptcy. In their view, this would not require any
changes to existing law.220 In addition to providing more resources for DIP

213
DeMarzo et al., supra note 3; Conti-Brown & Skeel, supra note 3, at 2; Judge, supra note 3; Morrison
& Saavedra, supra note 3, (“[I]f a stressed banking sector is unwilling to finance firms in Chapter 11, the
government can play an essential role in providing that financing.”).
214
Morrison & Andrea Saavedra, supra note 3.
215
Conti-Brown & Skeel, supra note 3, at 2 (“[M]any businesses, especially small and medium-sized
businesses, may find it impossible to arrange the financing they need to fund their operations during the
bankruptcy process.”).
216
See, e.g., DeMarzo supra note 3 (“The goal is not to stop Chapter 11 restructurings from occurring but
rather to limit their deadweight costs when they do occur . . . to minimize inefficient liquidations.”).
217
See Conti-Brown & Skeel, supra note 3, at 5.
218
See Judge, supra note 3; Morrison & Saavedra, supra note 3, at 7–8 (“[I]f a stressed banking sector is
unwilling to finance firms in Chapter 11, the government can play an essential role in providing that financing.”);
DeMarzo, supra note 3 (proposing that the U.S. Treasury would help support such a facility through an equity
investment). Levitin, et al., have proposed a permanent alternative to bankruptcy for large firms that would also
address the increasing need for financing firms in distress in times of crisis.); Levitin et al., supra note 3.
219
See Conti-Brown & Skeel, supra note 3, at 3; Judge, supra note 3.
220
It does appear, however, that the proposal is premised on courts granting “priming liens” to banks
providing DIP loans funded by this facility pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(d) (2018), which is otherwise a rare
occurrence. Conti-Brown & Skeel, supra note 3, at 14–15.

FEIBELMAN_2.1.22

46

2/3/2022 1:43 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

lending, they argue that the facility would help draw more banks into this
activity.221
Morrison and Saavedra have also proposed that recipients of government
support during the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly large corporations, should
be required to file for bankruptcy.222 Pursuant to this approach, the government
would be steering firms into the bankruptcy system, making that decision only
a semi-voluntary one. Furthermore, in these cases, as in Chrysler, the
government would be a creditor in these bankruptcies; depending on the timing
of the support and the bankruptcy filing, it would either be a pre-petition creditor
or a DIP lender. Among the rationales for this proposal is the fact that many of
these firms in distress would require assistance because of pre-pandemic
problems. In Morrison and Saavedra’s view, providing support without
requiring a bankruptcy filing “would allow these firms to use public funds to
further delay a necessary restructuring.”223 They also argue that requiring crisis
support through the bankruptcy system would also ensure that investors bear
some costs of the firm’s distress.224 As they write:
the speed of a bankruptcy case is largely dictated by the institution
providing the liquidity. Cash is king. The government, therefore, could
play an important role in preventing unnecessary asset fires sales and
pushing the process toward a reorganization that preserves viable firms
(and American jobs). This is precisely what we saw in the Chrysler
and GM cases.225

The typology and ordering principles describe above provide tools and a
framework for fully evaluating these proposals as a matter of bankruptcy policy.
Requiring that government support only be given to firms if they enter
bankruptcy, for example, would be a striking example of the government
directly triggering the use of the bankruptcy system. The proposals for the
government to create a facility for DIP lending inevitably implicates two
different categories of engagement. First, they involve the government having a
direct or indirect financial stake in cases within the bankruptcy system,
depending on whether the government lends to debtor firms in bankruptcy or to
banks that lend to firms, respectively. Second, they would inevitably involve the
government steering the operation of the system in significant ways. The facility
proposed by DeMarzo, Krishnamurthy, and Rauh, for example, would provide
221
222
223
224
225

Conti-Brown & Skeel, supra note 3, at 3.
Morrison & Saavedra, supra note 3, at 12–13.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 13–14.
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no- or low-interest DIP lending to firms in bankruptcy upon approval by the
bankruptcy court and the facility itself, pursuant to a template for the structure
of reorganizations that qualify for support.226 Conti-Brown and Skeel envision
that the Federal Reserve “advocate for banks’ participation in these programs as
part of the supervisory process.”227 Both proposals envision that the support
provided would be fully collateralized; this, in effect, will generally require that
it be provided a priming lien over pre-existing secured creditors.228
The ordering principles advanced in this Article suggest that the involvement
by the government in the bankruptcy system envisioned by these proposals could
be consistent with bankruptcy policy, even though it may “distort” private
decision-making, potentially direct the operation of the bankruptcy system, and
perhaps generate some micro-economic costs or inefficiency. As an initial
matter, one of the primary goals of these proposals is to improve the functioning
of the bankruptcy system and thus to advance bankruptcy-specific goals. To the
extent that these proposals aim to advance non-bankruptcy policies, those
policies are within the authority of the relevant government entities and should
presumptively outweigh the bankruptcy-specific functions they may displace.
But at some point, this presumption fades: when the regulatory goal is too
attenuated or obviously minor compared to the costs experienced by
stakeholders in bankruptcy system.
These proposals raise at least some concerns that the government’s nonbankruptcy regulatory goals might be somewhat attenuated from its actual
engagement in the bankruptcy system or outweighed by degree of its
intervention. They are all envisioned as general programs with more government
involvement than the “regulatory bankruptcy” observed by Woo. They are not
focused on particular cases or narrow categories of cases like the Chrysler
episode or the RBI’s targeting of largest NPA’s. Thus, there is less certainty of
a close regulatory fit with the universe of cases affected by the proposed policies.
This may suggest that there is more likelihood that the aggregate impact on the
operation of the bankruptcy system may be significant compared to the nonbankruptcy regulatory benefit. This is exacerbated if the government becomes
concerned about limiting its own losses under the program, motivated by
pecuniary interests rather than the regulatory aim.
To the extent that the proponents of such plans have addressed the
implications and potential dangers of the government’s involvement in the
226
227
228

DeMarzo supra note 3.
Conti-Brown & Skeel, supra note 3, 14.
DeMarzo, supra note 3; Conti-Brown & Skeel, supra note 3, at 14–16.
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bankruptcy system, they have tended to focus on the impact on the government,
not the bankruptcy system. Conti-Brown and Skeel argue that part of the
advantage of their proposal derives from the fact that these banking institutions
are subject to supervision and regulation. The facility, they argue, will expand
the amount of DIP financing in “the bank regulatory and supervisory framework
rather than in shadow banking”229 and “will give the Fed[ederal Reserve] useful
insights into the operations of bankrupt institutions, insights that will be essential
in both monetary policy and financial regulation.”230 They rightly worry about
the Federal Reserve’s involvement in the politically fraught realm of credit
policy and the reputational risks to it from participating in controversial aspects
of credit allocation, debt collection, and bankruptcy maneuvering. They
acknowledge that such a facility would draw the Federal Reserve into the
process of “business credit policy,” exposing the Federal Reserve to what is
generally a fiscal, and thus political government function. They propose,
however, that the risk of involving the Federal Reserve in such political activity
is attenuated because it is indirect, i.e., intermediated through private banks, and
is only justified in a time of crisis.231
But they have not given similar attention to the stakes of the Federal
Reserve’s involvement in the bankruptcy system for the latter. What, for
example, would be the impact on the bankruptcy system of bringing DIP
financing more directly into the bank regulatory and supervisory framework”?232
One should expect that, in implementing a DIP lending facility, the Federal
Reserve would engage in some kind of steering or conditioning the behavior of
DIP lenders in the bankruptcies of their borrowers. One should also expect that
the Federal Reserve would be influenced by its concern for recovery of its
financial support, which must be “secured to the satisfaction” of the Federal
Reserve Bank providing any such support.233 In either case, the Federal
Reserve’s involvement will presumably influence or displace the decisions of
direct stakeholders to at least some extent. If the regulatory aims of its actions
are too diffuse across cases or distorted by its own financial stake, then the
justification for its involvement will weaken.

229
Conti-Brown & Skeel, supra note 3, at 4. They also note that increasing bank involvement in DIP
lending would help “provid[e] useful assets for banks in an otherwise uncertain time.” Id. at 4.
230
Id. at 4.
231
See id. at 4, 18–20.
232
See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
233
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 347, 343 (2018)
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CONCLUSION
Anticipating a wave of bankruptcies caused by the economic and financial
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous commentators proposed
measures to expand the institutional capacity of the bankruptcy system. A
number of these proposals would represent dramatic and systematic government
involvement in the U.S. bankruptcy system. Such involvement by the
government in the bankruptcy system is a topic that is largely ignored in the
literature on bankruptcy. Where it is observed, it is generally criticized. Among
other things, it sits uneasily with dominant theories of bankruptcy that assume
the bankruptcy system should be driven by the interests of direct stakeholders in
particular cases.
This Article argues that involvement or influence by government actors in
the bankruptcy system is, in fact, broadly consistent with bankruptcy theory and
with the structural relationship between bankruptcy law and other legal and
regulatory components of the state. This relationship is subject to some basic
ordering principles. Bankruptcy law constrains and adjusts other legal regimes
to some extent, but it generally incorporates non-bankruptcy law and yields to
government’s regulatory actions. These ordering principles reasonably extend
to ad hoc government actions or “activism” in the bankruptcy system. In other
words, government actors do not contravene bankruptcy policy when they
employ the system to advance non-bankruptcy policies within their authority,
even when doing so enables the government to take actions and achieve goals
that it could not outside of the system. In some circumstances, however, the
regulatory policies or concerns motivating government involvement in the
bankruptcy system may be too diffuse or attenuated to justify the extent of its
intervention, especially if the effect is to discourage use of the bankruptcy
system. These ordering principles help clarify the relationship between
bankruptcy and other legal and regulatory regimes and provides a framework for
evaluating instances of government involvement in the bankruptcy system.
This Article elaborates upon these ordering principles by focusing in
particular on the relationship between bankruptcy and financial regulation.
Bankruptcy is part of the architecture of financial markets in a modern economy,
and the influence of financial regulators on the bankruptcy system should be
viewed as the product of overlapping regulatory functions, which require a logic
of ordering. Such regulatory influence generally operates in the deep
background, yet macro-prudential and systemic concerns will sometimes require
more direct government intervention and may override the efficiency concerns
or stakes of a particular bankruptcy case. This Article describes three episodes
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of regulatory intervention in the bankruptcy system—“regulatory bankruptcy”
during the 2008-09 financial crisis; the efforts by the Reserve Bank of India to
force some large commercial firms into India’s new insolvency system; and the
Chrysler bankruptcy. The ordering principles advanced in this Article generally
justify the government involvement in these cases and, to some extent, in the
COVID-era proposals as well. However, the degree of regulatory involvement
in the bankruptcy system envisioned by some of these recent proposals may be
disproportionate to, or attenuated from, their underlying regulatory goals. If so,
they may fall beyond the scope of justified government involvement in the
bankruptcy system.

